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Article
Hostile Learning Environments, the First Amendment,
and Public Higher Education
TODD E. PETTYS
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the First Amendment status
of student-on-student verbal harassment at public institutions of higher education.
Does the First Amendment permit public colleges and universities to discipline
students on the grounds that their speech has created a hostile learning environment
for others on campus? If so, what is the analysis underlying that constitutional
judgment, and what are the requisite hallmarks of such an environment? Does it
matter whether a student’s speech created the hostile learning environment on its
own or whether it wielded that power only by virtue of its combination with the
speech of other students? Does it matter whether the speech was directed to those
for whom it created the hostile learning environment or whether the speech was
merely overheard?
This Article addresses those questions. To frame the First Amendment discussion,
the Article provides a statute-centered description of harassment and hostile learning
environments; the description is a familiar one, but it is nevertheless often
mischaracterized. The Article then argues that, if the Court’s Speech Clause
jurisprudence was insistently originalist in nature, we could confidently say that the
First Amendment gives public colleges and universities broad latitude to discipline
students for speech that, in administrators’ judgment, is antithetical to important
institutional values. But the Court today rejects key analytic touchstones that an
originalist methodology would likely favor. Using the modern Court’s preferred
framework, the Article advances arguments that rely heavily upon both tradition and
modern free-speech values. The Article contends that, in some circumstances, student
speech that creates hostile learning environments for classmates is categorically
excluded from the First Amendment’s protection. In other circumstances, however,
the First Amendment shields students from discipline, unless they make harassing
statements with a mens rea akin to that of actual malice in defamation law.
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Hostile Learning Environments, the First Amendment,
and Public Higher Education
TODD E. PETTYS *
INTRODUCTION
At public colleges and universities, does the First Amendment permit
school officials to discipline students on the grounds that their speech has
created a hostile learning environment for other students on campus?1 If so,
what is the analysis underlying that constitutional judgment, and what are
the requisite hallmarks of such an environment? Does it matter whether a
student’s speech created the hostile learning environment on its own or
whether it wielded that power only by virtue of its combination with the
speech of other students? Does it matter whether the speech was directed to
those for whom it created the hostile learning environment or whether the
speech was merely overheard?
These questions, all of which I address in this Article, relate to the bind
in which public institutions of higher education can find themselves when
students speak in ways that other students find unacceptable.2 On the one
hand, postsecondary schools have powerful incentives to create learning
environments that will appeal to the students they aim to recruit and retain.
Colleges and universities compete with one another for mobile
tuition-payers, of course, but they have noneconomic reasons to think about
their campus climates, as well. An institution that wishes to reap the
educational benefits that can flow from assembling a racially diverse student
body, for example, will want to maintain a campus environment that
welcomes, rather than alienates, students of color.3 On the other hand, the
*

H. Blair and Joan V. White Chair in Civil Litigation, University of Iowa College of Law.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”);
id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law . . . .”);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[W]e may and do assume that freedom of speech and
of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among
the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States.”).
2
See Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 MINN. L. REV.
1801, 1804–06 (2017) (providing examples of campus speech controversies and describing the pressures
they place on administrators); Alexander Tsesis, Campus Speech and Harassment, 101 MINN. L. REV.
1863, 1863 (2017) (“Those who administer the effectiveness of young adults’ educational experiences
must walk a tightrope of providing their charges with the means to discuss controversial issues while
preventing debate from deteriorating into harassment.”).
3
Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (“The Law School has determined, based on
its experience and expertise, that a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further
its compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.”).
1
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First Amendment does not permit public colleges and universities to restrict
some students’ speech simply because other students find the speech
objectionable. As the Supreme Court explained half a century ago, its
“precedents . . . leave no room for the view that, because of the
acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply
with less force on college campuses than in the community at large.”4 When
it comes to speech in the larger community, the Court has repeatedly stressed
that the First Amendment does not allow public officials to restrict
expression merely because some deem it offensive,5 or even outrageous.6
There are, to be sure, a few well-established categories of expression
that public officials may entirely proscribe, but those categories are
exceptionally narrow in scope. For example, policymakers can ban “fighting
words”—words that a speaker directs to another person and that are likely
to provoke an immediate, violent response.7 But the fighting-words doctrine
does not typically apply when speakers deliver their messages in a manner
not involving face-to-face confrontations, such as when the target of
harassment finds a note slipped under her door, graffiti scrawled on a wall,
4

Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210
(1975) (“[T]he Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected
speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer.”); Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (“It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public
expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of
their hearers.”). Courts have invalidated some schools’ speech codes on these grounds. See, e.g., DeJohn
v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 317–20 (3d Cir. 2008) (invalidating Temple University’s ban on
“offensive” speech); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1182–84 (6th Cir. 1995) (invalidating
Central Michigan University’s ban on speech creating an offensive educational environment).
6
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (explaining that “[o]utrageousness” is a
constitutionally unacceptable basis on which to restrict speech); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)
(“As a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting,
and even outrageous, speech in order to provide ‘adequate “breathing space” to the freedoms protected
by the First Amendment.’”); Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (“‘Outrageousness’ in the
area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to
impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a
particular expression.”).
7
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572–73 (1942) (articulating the fighting-words
doctrine); see also Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (stating that fighting words are those that a reasonable person
would take as “an invitation to exchange fisticuffs”); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)
(defining fighting words as “those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary
citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction”). The
Chaplinsky Court said that fighting words also include words that “by their very utterance inflict injury.”
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. As Johnson and Cohen illustrate, however, that portion of the Chaplinsky
formulation has since been dropped. See Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 623–25 (7th Cir. 2008)
(describing the doctrine’s evolution).
5
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or a noose hung in a locker. Even when speakers and their audiences do
meet face to face, the doctrine often gets no traction because the
circumstances are not ones in which immediate violence is likely to erupt.9
State officials can also ban “true threats,” but the doctrine similarly
covers only a small fraction of the speech that students might find
environmentally toxic. True threats are “statements where the speaker means
to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”10
Although threats are certainly capable of causing great upheaval in people’s
lives, there are innumerable other expressive means by which students can
poison the learning climate for classmates.
The same is true for other established categories of wholly proscribable
speech, such as incitement11 and obscenity.12 Environmentally problematic
speech might sometimes take such forms, but often it will not. We must,
therefore, think about environmental concerns on their own terms. Under
what circumstances, if any, does the First Amendment permit public
institutions of higher education to discipline student speakers for the very
reason that their speech has created a hostile learning environment for others?
I begin in Part I by describing the hallmarks of hostile learning
environments. The description flows from federal legislation that imposes
financial consequences on colleges and universities if they receive federal
financial assistance and fail to respond to known harassment in a statutorily
adequate manner. When it comes to student-on-student harassment, the
criteria for statutory liability are demanding—more demanding, I will argue,
than some have been willing to acknowledge. Although one could define
hostile learning environments in less stringent ways for the purpose of
framing a First Amendment discussion, I seize upon the statute-centered
8
See State v. Dugan, 303 P.3d 755, 765–67 (Mont. 2013) (surveying multiple jurisdictions’ rulings
and concluding that the fighting-words doctrine entails a face-to-face requirement and thus does not apply
to words uttered during a telephone call); Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1554 (1993) (“Insulting language must be spoken in close physical proximity to
the addressee to be considered fighting words. Otherwise, the burden is on the addressee to ‘cool off.’”).
9
Courts applying the fighting-words doctrine examine the speech’s context to determine whether
an ordinary person in those circumstances likely would have responded to the speaker with immediate
physical violence. See In re Nickolas S., 245 P.3d 446, 451–52 (Ariz. 2011) (discussing cases taking this
approach). In Nickolas S., for example, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that a student had not
uttered fighting words when—from ten feet away and in a loud voice—he called his teacher a “fucking
bitch.” Id. at 447–48. The court did not believe that “the natural reaction of the average teacher to a
student’s profane and insulting outburst, unaccompanied by any threats, would be to beat the student.”
Id. at 452.
10
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). The doctrine’s purpose is to “protect[] individuals
from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur.” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
11
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.”).
12
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (describing the key components of
constitutionally unprotected obscenity).

6
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definition for two primary reasons. First, the Court has never determined the
First Amendment status of speech that amounts to statutorily proscribed
harassment, so it remains an issue of considerable importance. Second, if the
Court ultimately finds that the First Amendment can be squared with speech
restrictions aimed at eliminating hostile learning environments on college
and university campuses, it almost certainly will be—for reasons that will
become clear as the Article proceeds—with the statute-centered definition
of those environments in mind.
I argue in Part II that, if the Court’s Speech Clause jurisprudence was
insistently originalist in nature, we could say, with a high degree of
confidence, that the First Amendment gives public colleges and universities
broad latitude to discipline students for speech that administrators regard as
antithetical to important institutional objectives. The modern Court,
however, has rejected key analytic touchstones that an originalist
methodology would likely favor, both with respect to Speech Clause
principles in general and with respect to the rights of postsecondary students
in particular. Understanding the degree to which the Court has departed from
originalist precepts helps illuminate the challenges one faces when arguing
that the First Amendment permits public institutions of higher education to
discipline student speakers on hostile-environment grounds.
In Part III, I use several short scenarios to advance a range of
constitutional arguments. I first contend that the First Amendment does not
permit a public college or university to discipline a student merely on the
grounds that he or she has made a statement that would create a hostile
learning environment for others if it were repeated with sufficient frequency.
Relying on reasons grounded both in tradition and in core free-expression
values, I then argue that the First Amendment does not bar public institutions
of higher education from disciplining students who single-handedly create
hostile learning environments of the type defined in Part I. When the hostile
learning environment is created by multiple students who each add a few
bricks to the harassment wall, or when it is created by speech that is not
directed to the harassment victim but that the victim nevertheless overhears,
I contend that discipline should be deemed constitutionally permissible only
when the speakers make their utterances with a mens rea akin to that of
actual malice in defamation law.
I. THE HALLMARKS OF HOSTILE LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS
There are many ways we might define hostile learning environments,
but the most constitutionally promising account comes from the Court’s
interpretation of federal antidiscrimination legislation. Briefly told, the story
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begins with a few foundational notes about Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the uncertain First Amendment status of speech that creates
hostile work environments, then shifts to legislation that pertains more
directly to the statutory rights of students.
A. Title VII and Hostile Work Environments
Title VII makes it unlawful for employers “to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”13 Embracing guidelines issued in 1980 by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 14 the Court in Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson15 confirmed that one form of discrimination
forbidden by Title VII is “hostile environment” harassment.16 For a Title
VII hostile-environment claim to be actionable, the harassment inflicted
upon the employee must be more than merely offensive. 17 Both
subjectively (from the perspective of the plaintiff) and objectively (from
the perspective of a reasonable person), 18 the harassment “must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.”19
Harassment that violates Title VII can take the form of conduct or
speech. 20 When it takes the form of speech, might the First Amendment
shield the employer from liability? Remarkably, the Court has never
directly answered that question, though it has brushed up against it more
than once.
Writing for the Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Justice Scalia
indicated in dictum that at least some applications of Title VII’s ban on
harassing workplace speech are constitutionally permissible. 21 The Court
13

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980).
15
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
16
See id. at 65–66. This is different from “quid pro quo” harassment, which occurs when, for
example, an employer threatens to fire an employee unless she engages in sexual activity or denounces
her religion. See id. at 65.
17
See id. at 67 (stating that the “‘mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders
offensive feelings in an employee’ would not affect the conditions of employment to [a] sufficiently
significant degree to violate Title VII”) (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
18
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993).
19
Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (explaining that, to determine whether an actionably hostile environment exists, a
court should examine all the circumstances, including (among relevant others) “the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance”).
20
See, e.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir.
1994) (recounting both verbal and physical harassment of a female employee). For a brief discussion of
Judge Posner’s influential opinion in Carr, see Martha Nussbaum, Carr, Before and After: Power and
Sex in Carr v Allison Gas Turbine Division, General Motors Corp, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1831 (2007).
21
505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
14

8
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in R.A.V. held that the First Amendment’s hostility to content-based speech
restrictions extends even to areas of wholly proscribable expression, such
as when policymakers permit some fighting words but ban others, then
distinguish between the permissible and the forbidden based on what the
speaker says. 22 Justice Scalia reasoned that, if lawmakers are troubled by
certain instances of wholly proscribable speech, they need not make
content-based distinctions within the given category of proscribable
expression to address their concerns; they can simply ban the entire
category. 23 The Court identified exceptional circumstances, however,
when lawmakers may indeed make content-based distinctions rather than
enact category-wide bans. 24 One such set of circumstances is when the
subcategory of expression that lawmakers opt to proscribe “happens to be
associated with particular secondary effects of the speech, so that the
regulation is justified without reference to the content of the speech.”25 To
illustrate, Justice Scalia pointed to Title VII:
[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws
directed not against speech but against conduct (a law against
treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the
Nation’s defense secrets), a particular content-based
subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept
up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at
conduct rather than speech. . . . Thus, for example, sexually
derogatory “fighting words,” among other words, may
produce a violation of Title VII’s general prohibition against
sexual discrimination in employment practices.26

22
See id. at 382–84; see also supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text (describing several
categories of wholly proscribable expression). Content-based speech restrictions are permissible only if
the government can show that they are “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015); see also id. (“Government regulation of speech is content
based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message
expressed.”).
23
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395–96 (“The dispositive question in this case, therefore, is whether
content discrimination is reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul’s compelling interests; it plainly is not.
An ordinance not limited to the favored topics, for example, would have precisely the same beneficial
effect.”).
24
See id. at 388–90. The thread running through each exception is that there is no risk that the
government is trying to “‘drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’” Id. at 387 (quoting
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
25
Id. at 389 (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
26
Id.
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Writing for himself and for Justices Blackmun, O’Connor, and Stevens,
Justice White was unpersuaded. He believed the majority had held that “a
narrowly drawn, content-based ordinance could never pass constitutional
muster if the object of that legislation could be accomplished by banning a
wider category of speech.”27 Under that approach, an alarmed Justice White
wrote, “Title VII hostile work environment claims would suddenly be
unconstitutional,” since Congress could have banned “workplace
harassment generally” instead of banning only harassment that is based on
specified traits.28 He took no comfort in Justice Scalia’s use of Title VII to
illustrate an exception to the Court’s general rule. Far from reaching
harassing speech merely as an incidental byproduct of regulating
discriminatory conduct, Justice White argued, Title VII and its
accompanying regulations focus, to a large degree, squarely on speech.29
Although all nine Justices in R.A.V. thus looked favorably upon Title
VII in at least some of its applications, they could not agree upon the First
Amendment analysis that would render such applications permissible. Just
two Terms later, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,30 the Court had an
opportunity to resolve the matter. The primary question in Harris was
whether a Title VII plaintiff bringing a hostile-environment claim must
prove that the harassment “seriously affect[ed] [his or her] psychological
well-being.”31 As part of its argument in that case, the employer contended
that the First Amendment bars Title VII liability for hostile-environment
harassment, unless the harassment adversely impacted the “plaintiff’s ability
to do her job.”32 The plaintiff replied that the First Amendment does not
protect harassing speech when it is severe or pervasive and is directed at a
particular employee.33

27

Id. at 404 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 409. Justice White did not explain the First Amendment analysis that, in his view, would
render such a ban permissible.
29
See id. at 409–10 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991)); see also Peter Caldwell, Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment & First Amendment Content-Neutrality: Putting the Supreme Court on
the Right Path, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 373, 386 (2006) (“Some scholars would agree that the
‘conduct-not-speech’ exception is not legally tenable in the manner described by Justice Scalia [in
R.A.V.].”). Justice White would have preferred to decide the case on overbreadth grounds. See R.A.V.,
505 U.S. at 411–14 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
30
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
31
Id. at 20. The Court ruled that psychological injury is not an essential element of a Title VII
hostile-environment claim. See id. at 22 (“Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a
reasonable person’s psychological well-being, but the statute is not limited to such conduct.”).
32
Brief for Respondent at 32, Harris, 510 U.S. 17 (No. 92-1168). Citing First Amendment
concerns, amicus Feminists for Free Expression urged the Court to “adopt a standard which focuses not
on the plaintiff’s subjective reactions to the conduct or expression involved, but rather on the harmfulness
of repeated or pervasive harassing conduct which has demonstrably hindered an employee in his or her
work performance.” Brief of Amicus Curiae Feminists for Free Expression in Support of Petitioner at 6,
Harris, 510 U.S. 17 (No. 92-1168).
33
See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 10–11, Harris, 510 U.S. 17 (No. 92-1168).
28
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Did the Justices weigh in on that First Amendment dispute? It depends
on whom you ask. When the Court handed down its decision in Harris less
than a month after oral argument, readers discovered that the majority’s
analysis was only three pages in length and it said nothing about the
constitutional issues that the litigants had raised.34 For some, the Harris
Court’s silence signaled that the Justices found the employer’s First
Amendment defense so frivolous that it did not even merit a response.35 That
conclusion, however, probably takes things too far. Given the Court’s
internal disagreements about the appropriate First Amendment analysis for
Title VII liability just a year and a half earlier in R.A.V.,36 it seems more
likely that the Justices concluded there was no need to venture into the First
Amendment thicket to decide the narrow statutory question on which they
had granted certiorari.
Nearly three decades have since passed, however, and the Court still has
not returned to First Amendment questions about Title VII—a lengthy
silence that could very well reflect a favorable disposition toward Title VII,
even if the constitutional premises that should underlie that disposition
remain in dispute. Whatever the reasons for the silence, we have been left
for the time being to sort out the important First Amendment details for
ourselves. Invoking a variety of rationales, many have concluded that the
First Amendment gives those who violate Title VII no refuge.37 Others have
34

See Harris, 510 U.S. at 19–23.
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW 347, 356 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (arguing that,
through its silence, the Court intended to “insult” the argument that verbal harassers are constitutionally
entitled to alter the conditions of other people’s employment). Characterizing the employer’s First
Amendment objections as the “dog that didn’t bark,” Richard Fallon similarly infers that the Court “is
highly unlikely” to hold that the First Amendment protects “workplace expressions of gender-based
hostility and communications of explicitly sexual messages.” See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual
Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT .
REV. 1, 2, 9.
36
See supra notes 21–29 and accompanying text (discussing R.A.V.).
37
So far as lower courts’ opinions are concerned, the leading ruling remains Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). In Robinson, pictures of nude women
appeared throughout the workplace, male employees often read pornographic magazines at work, and
male employees frequently made sexually outrageous statements to their female coworkers. See id. at
1493–1502. The court unleashed a fusillade of rationales for knocking down First Amendment obstacles
to Title VII liability, but it did not elaborate at length on any of them. In two breathless pages, the court
concluded that the verbal sexual harassment at issue in that case was best seen as “discriminatory
conduct . . . . indistinguishable from the speech that comprises a crime”; “the regulation of discriminatory
speech in the workplace constitutes nothing more than a time, place, and manner regulation of speech”;
the female employees who suffered the harassment were a “captive audience,” such that the First
Amendment did not bar Congress’s effort to bring them relief; even if the harassing speech enjoyed the
First Amendment’s full protection, Title VII survives strict scrutiny; and, because the First Amendment
35
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argued that, in fact, the First Amendment bars Title VII liability for verbal
harassment, unless the harassing speech falls within one of the narrowly
defined categories of wholly proscribable expression that the Court has
already identified.38
permits governmental employers to regulate employee speech when necessary to maintain order and
morale, Congress can insist that private employers do the same. Id. at 1535–36.
Commentators who agree that the First Amendment does not shield employers from Title VII
liability have invoked some of those same arguments, as well as others. Some contend, for example, that
harassing speech should be reconceptualized as conduct. See, e.g., John F. Wirenius, Actions as Words,
Words as Actions: Sexual Harassment Law, the First Amendment and Verbal Acts, 28 WHITTIER L. REV.
905, 908 (2007) (“The congruence between the case law establishing the scope of the hostile work
environment doctrine and the verbal act concept is not perfect. However, it is sufficiently close to justify
retention of this cause of action as consistent with the mandates of the First Amendment.”); cf.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 45 (1993) (“If ever words have been understood as acts, it
has been when they are sexual harassment.”). Some posit that Congress’s regulation of harassing speech
is actually content-neutral in nature, such that the regulation must survive a standard of review less
onerous than strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech: The First
Amendment Is Not Hostile to a Content-Neutral Hostile-Environment Theory, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 227,
227–28 (“[P]roperly interpreted, Title VII regulates speech and conduct not so much on the basis of the
content of ideas expressed as on the harasser’s selection of targets for harassment and the effect the
harassment produces on working conditions.”). Focusing on Title VII’s ban on sexual harassment in the
workplace, Jack Balkin invokes the captive-audience doctrine, arguing that the legislation is designed to
bring relief to women trapped in coercive, subordinating work conditions. See J.M. Balkin, Free Speech
and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2310–13 (1999). Cynthia Estlund contends that the
government should have greater leeway to regulate speech in the workplace than it does in the public
square “because it is workplace diversity, as enforced by the equality norm, that renders the workplace a
uniquely valuable forum for speech and an important satellite forum for public discourse.” Cynthia L.
Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75
TEX. L. REV. 687, 694–95 (1997); cf. Robert Post, Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment, in
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 35, at 382, 391–92 (suggesting that the
workplace is a site where people can be trained for constructive participation in civil discourse and that
the government might thus have greater regulatory powers in that realm akin to those it possesses in K–
12 schools). Still others argue that the values commonly associated with the freedom of expression are
not advanced by tolerating harassment. See, e.g., Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REV.
461, 479–80 (1995) (discussing sexual harassment).
Some of those arguments suffer from clear weaknesses. Declaring that all harassing speech is mere
conduct, for example, seems perilously close to alchemy designed to evade First Amendment obstacles.
See infra notes 197–200 and accompanying text. The notion that federal antiharassment legislation
regulates speech on a content-neutral basis is weak on its face: how can one know whether harassing
speech concerns a trait like race or sex or is objectively offensive, for example, unless one examines what
the speaker has said? And the captive-audience doctrine is famously slippery. See Papandrea, supra note
2, at 1824 (“The Court has not always embraced the captive audience doctrine, and defining this doctrine
is a study in frustration.”); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?,
1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 501 (“The captive audience concept in particular is an elusive and challenging one
to apply.”).
38
See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Hostile Environment Law and the Threat to Freedom of Expression
in the Workplace, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2004) (likening the then-emerging body of hostileenvironment law to “fascism”); Kingsley R. Browne, Zero Tolerance for the First Amendment: Title
VII’s Regulation of Employee Speech, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 563, 605 (2001) (arguing that many
applications of Title VII are unconstitutional); Richard Allen Olmstead, In Defense of the Indefensible:
Title VII Hostile Environment Claims Unconstitutionally Restrict Free Speech, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
691, 692 (2001) (“Hostile environment harassment law is an unconstitutional restriction on free
speech.”); cf. Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free Speech
and Sexual Harassment, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1003, 1035 (1993) (concluding that “the Supreme
Court’s treatment of the First Amendment raises serious concerns for the enforcement of hostile-
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Despite its silence on constitutional questions concerning speech and
hostile work environments, the Court has built upon aspects of its Title VII
jurisprudence when resolving statutory questions about the federal rights of
students. It is to those matters that we now turn.
B. Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation and Hostile Learning Environments
Three similarly worded antidiscrimination statutes are important for
our purposes here: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which declares
that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance”;39 Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, which states that “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”;40 and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified
individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason
of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”41 Under these enactments, schools
risk being held liable in private actions for damages42 and losing their
environment sexual harassment litigation”); Wayne Lindsey Robbins, Jr., When Two Liberal Values
Collide in an Era of “Political Correctness”: First Amendment Protection as a Check on Speech-Based
Title VII Hostile Environment Claims, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 789, 811 (1995) (arguing that “public policy
supports upholding the First Amendment defense to defeat Title VII hostile environment claims based
solely on speech about matters of public concern”) (capitalization altered).
39
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
40
Education Amendments of 1972 § 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
41
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The three statutes described above are not
the only statutes of that type. The Age Discrimination Act of 1975 declares, for example, that “no person
in the United States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.” Age Discrimination Act of 1975 § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 6102.
42
None of these three statutes—the Civil Rights Act, the Education Amendments, and the
Rehabilitation Act—expressly authorizes private actions for damages, but courts have found such
authorizations implied. Regarding Title IX, the Supreme Court first found an implied right of action in
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), but did not say whether damages were among
the available remedies. See id. at 717. The Court subsequently held in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), that Title IX permits private actions for damages against schools for teacheron-student harassment but did not elaborate on the circumstances in which those damages are owed. See
id. at 74–76. The Court moved more deeply into those waters in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998), holding that “a damages remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an
official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective
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federal funding if they do not satisfactorily respond when their students
are badly harassed by classmates or school employees on the basis of race,
color, national origin, sex, or disability. 44
As is true with respect to Title VII and hostile work environments, 45
speech and conduct—either alone or in combination—can bring these
federal statutes into play. Both harassing speech and harassing conduct
were alleged, for example, in recent Title IX litigation involving students
in the University of Michigan’s M.B.A. program. 46 In a Title IX case
concerning the University of Mary Washington, the harassment took the
measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s programs”
and responds in a manner that manifests “deliberate indifference to [that] discrimination.” Id. at 290. The
Gebser Court did not have occasion to elaborate on the “deliberate indifference” standard because the
plaintiff’s claim in that case clearly failed on the first requirement—namely, the school did not have
actual knowledge of the harassment that the plaintiff was suffering. See id. at 291. In Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999), the Court held that Title IX authorizes private damages
actions when schools are deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-on-student harassment, and
the Court elaborated on what deliberate indifference entails. Id. at 643; see also infra notes 51–71 and
accompanying text (discussing Davis).
Regarding Title VI, the Cannon Court noted that Congress modeled Title IX on Title VI and that—
when Congress enacted Title IX in 1972—numerous lower courts had already held that Title VI
implicitly authorized private enforcement actions. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694–96. The Court reiterated in
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), that section 601 “prohibits only intentional discrimination”
and “private individuals may sue to enforce [that statutory provision] and obtain both injunctive relief
and damages.” Id. at 279–80. The Court has not provided further guidance on Title VI liability, but lower
courts routinely draw close parallels between Title VI’s and Title IX’s requirements. See infra note 72
and accompanying text (noting lower courts’ rulings).
Regarding section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Congress declared via amendment in 1978
that the remedies available for violations of Title VI shall also be available for violations of section 504.
See Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-602, § 120, 92 Stat. 2955, 2983 (1978) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2)). The
Court has strongly suggested that private actions for compensatory (but not punitive) damages are thus
permissible. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 184–90 (2002) (holding that punitive damages are
impermissible but indicating in dictum that compensatory damages for violations of section 504 are
available). Lower courts have held that section 504 does indeed provide an implied private right of action
for damages. See, e.g., Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 930 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Section 504 establishes
an implied private right of action allowing victims of prohibited discrimination, exclusion, or denial of
benefits to seek the full panoply of remedies, including equitable relief and compensatory damages.”)
(alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 973–74, 978–
79 (8th Cir. 1982) (concluding that section 504 implicitly authorizes private actions for damages).
43
See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (directing federal funding departments
and agencies to issue rules aimed at ensuring compliance with Title VI’s antidiscrimination requirements
and declaring that, so long as specified procedures are followed, federal funds may be withdrawn if
recipients fail to obey those rules); Education Amendments of 1972 § 902, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (issuing
similar directions for enforcing Title IX); Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (issuing
similar directions for enforcing the Rehabilitation Act).
44
See, e.g., Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2012) (adjudicating a Title
VI claim alleging that a New York school district did not adequately respond to racial harassment that
Caucasian students inflicted upon a Latino high school student over a period of more than three years);
Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2007) (adjudicating a Title IX claim alleging that the
University of North Carolina did not adequately respond to sexual harassment that a soccer coach
allegedly inflicted on his players).
45
See supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining that Title VII harassment can take the form
of conduct or speech).
46
Foster v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich., 982 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
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form of misogynistic speech directed at female students who opposed
on-campus fraternities and who condemned male rugby team members for
reportedly chanting lyrics that glorified violence against women. 47 In a
Title VI case concerning a school district in Texas, the alleged harassment
primarily consisted of racist statements repeatedly directed at three
African-American siblings. 48 In a section 504 case concerning a different
Texas school district, students both verbally and physically harassed a
disabled student.49 My focus here, of course, is on harassment that takes
the form of speech or that takes the form of conduct sufficiently expressive
to bring the First Amendment into play. 50
With respect to student-on-student harassment based on one of the
congressionally specified traits, when, precisely, are schools statutorily
obliged to intervene? The central authority on these matters is the Court’s
1999 decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education. 51 In that
case, a mother filed a Title IX damages action against a Georgia school
board, alleging that the board had not adequately responded when her
fifth-grade daughter was sexually harassed by a classmate. 52 The Court had
ruled one year earlier in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District53 that recipients of federal funding are liable for damages under
Title IX when they know about teacher-on-student sexual harassment and
are “deliberately indifferent” to it.54 The plaintiff in Davis argued that the
same rule should apply when a student’s harasser is a classmate. 55 The
lower courts rejected that argument but, by a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court

47

Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 680–84 (4th Cir. 2018).
Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 402–06 (5th Cir. 2015).
49
Estate of Lance v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 982, 987–89 (5th Cir. 2014).
50
Conduct can indeed be sufficiently expressive to qualify as speech. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (“[T]he First Amendment shields
such acts as saluting a flag (and refusing to do so), wearing an armband to protest a war, displaying a red
flag, and even marching, walking or parading in uniforms displaying the swastika . . . . [A] narrow,
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection . . . .”) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“In deciding whether
particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play,
we have asked whether an intent to convey a particularized message was present, and whether the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”) (alterations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51
526 U.S. 629 (1999).
52
Id. at 632–33.
53
524 U.S. 274 (1998).
54
Id. at 277.
55
See Brief for Petitioner, Davis, 526 U.S. 629 (No. 97-843), 1998 WL 792418, at *42–45.
48
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embraced it. With Justice O’Connor writing for the majority, the Court
agreed with the school board that “a recipient of federal funds may be
liable in damages under Title IX only for its own misconduct.” 57 But
“in certain limited circumstances,” Justice O’Connor explained, a
school’s reaction to student harassment can itself amount to statutorily
forbidden discrimination. 58
The Davis Court outlined three sets of interrelated facts that are
necessary to trigger schools’ Title IX liability for their handling of
student-on-student harassment. All three are relevant to our discussion of
public colleges and universities, but it is the third on which I ultimately
focus most of my attention. First, as the Justices had already explained in
Gebser, 59 a school becomes liable only when it actually knows about the
harassment and is “deliberately indifferent” to it.60 To amount to deliberate
indifference, the school’s response to the harassment must be “clearly
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”61 Justice O’Connor
explained that, if there is more than one way that school officials could
reasonably respond to harassment in a given instance, courts must give
those officials room to decide which remedial steps to take since Congress
has not itself specified any particular remedial measures that are required. 62
The Court acknowledged, for example, that “it would be entirely
reasonable for a school to refrain from a form of disciplinary action that
would expose it to constitutional or statutory claims.”63
Second, an institution is liable only if it has “substantial control over
both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs.”64
Absent such control, one cannot say that the institution plays a causal role
in the harassment. 65 If a person unaffiliated with a school sexually harasses
one of the school’s students outside of school hours and beyond school
56
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas in dissent, Justice Kennedy
argued that “Title IX did not give States unambiguous notice that accepting federal funds meant ceding
to the Federal Government power over the day-to-day disciplinary decisions of schools.” Davis, 526 U.S.
at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57
Id. at 640.
58
Id. at 643.
59
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
60
Davis, 526 U.S. at 643.
61
Id. at 648.
62
See id. (rejecting the proposition “that recipients can avoid liability only by purging their schools
of actionable peer harassment or that administrators must engage in particular disciplinary action” and
explaining that “courts should refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school
administrators”).
63
Id. at 649.
64
Id. at 645; see also id. at 646–47 (stating that a school may not be held liable unless “the harasser
is under the school’s disciplinary authority”).
65
See id. at 644–46; see also id. at 644 (stating that a school “cannot be directly liable for its
indifference where it lacks the authority to take remedial action”); id. at 645 (stating that, for statutory
liability to attach, a funding recipient’s “deliberate indifference must, at a minimum, cause students to
undergo harassment or make them liable or vulnerable to it”) (alterations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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grounds, for example, school officials are not able to take action against
the harasser in a bid to bring the harassment to an end. Even when the
harasser is one of the victim’s classmates and the harassment occurs on
school property, statutory liability depends on whether school officials are
empowered to control the harasser’s behavior. Because “the nature of [the
State’s] power [over schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a
degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free
adults,”66 the Court observed, it follows that “[a] university might not . . .
be expected to exercise the same degree of control over its students that a
grade school would enjoy.”67
Third, focusing on Title IX’s reference to individuals being “excluded
from participation in [or] denied the benefits of . . . any education[al]
program or activity,”68 the Court concluded that a school is liable under
Title IX only for deliberate indifference to harassment that is “so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts
from the victims’ educational experience, that the victim-students are
effectively denied equal access to an institution’s resources and
opportunities.”69 Single incidents of teasing, name-calling, or other
common forms of peer-on-peer harassment among children, for example,
are unlikely to rise to that level.70 The plaintiff’s allegations in Davis itself,
however, were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss: the alleged
harassment occurred repeatedly over a five-month period; it consisted of
both speech and “objectively offensive touching”; it negatively affected
the plaintiff’s education; the alleged harasser had other victims who sought
the school principal’s help; and the school board allegedly knew of the
harassment but “made no effort whatsoever either to investigate or to put
an end to [it].”71
Davis was a Title IX case, but its significance extends well beyond
that realm. Lower courts have concluded that Davis provides the
appropriate analytic framework for adjudicating federal-funding
recipients’ obligations under Title VI when one student harasses another
66
Id. at 646 (alteration in original) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655
(1995)).
67
Id. at 649.
68
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
69
Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)); see
also id. at 652 (explaining that the harassment that Congress aimed to curb when it enacted Title IX is
harassment “serious enough to have the systemic effect of denying the victim equal access to an
educational program or activity”).
70
Id. at 651–52.
71
Id. at 653–54.
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on grounds of race, color, or national origin, and under section 504
when one student harasses another on grounds of disability.73 Moreover,
although the Court has said that the liability standards for Title IX claims
and for sex-discrimination claims brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause “may not be wholly congruent,”74
lower courts have embraced much of the Davis standard for resolving
equal protection claims brought against public school officials for
student-on-student harassment.75
72

One District Court recently summarized the relevant Title VI law this way:
To sustain a student-on-student harassment claim against a school, the plaintiff must
demonstrate the following elements: “(1) the harassment was so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that it could be said to deprive [the plaintiff] of access to the
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school; (2) [the school] had
actual knowledge of the harassment; and (3) [the school was] deliberately indifferent
to the harassment.”

Estate of Olsen v. Fairfield City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 341 F. Supp. 3d 793, 803 (S.D. Ohio 2018)
(quoting Brooks v. Skinner, 139 F. Supp. 3d 869, 882 (S.D. Ohio 2015)); see also Fennell v. Marion
Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 408 (5th Cir. 2015) (“We agree that the correct analytical framework for
a Title VI student-on-student harassment claim is the deliberate indifference standard [described in
Davis].”); Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Title VI and Title IX are so similar that a
decision interpreting one generally applies to the other.”); Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d
655, 665 (2d Cir. 2012) (deploying the Davis framework to adjudicate a Title VI claim of deliberate
indifference to student-on-student racial discrimination); Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-38, 334 F.3d
928, 934 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The Court’s reasoning in Davis guides our resolution of the instant case
because Congress based Title IX on Title VI; therefore, the Court’s analysis of what constitutes
intentional sexual discrimination under Title IX directly informs our analysis of what constitutes
intentional racial discrimination under Title VI (and vice versa).”); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist.,
240 F.3d 200, 206 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Although . . . Davis dealt with sexual harassment under Title IX,
we believe that [its] reasoning applies equally to harassment on the basis of the personal characteristics
enumerated in Title VI and other relevant federal anti-discrimination statutes.”). The Supreme Court has
said nothing to the contrary. Cf. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979) (“The drafters of Title
IX explicitly assumed that it would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during the
preceding eight years.”).
73
A 2016 Fourth Circuit ruling illustrates the point:
In the [section] 504 context, the Davis deliberate indifference standard requires a
plaintiff [suing a school that receives federal funds] to show that he was an individual
with a disability, harassed by fellow students based on his disability; that the
disability-based harassment was sufficiently “severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive” that it effectively deprived him of “access to educational benefits and
opportunities” at school; and that the school knew about the disability-based studenton-student harassment and was deliberately indifferent to it.
S.B. ex rel. A.L. v. Bd. of Educ., 819 F.3d 69, 76 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 650); see
also Estate of Lance v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 982, 995–96 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing
illustrative cases).
74
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 257 (2009).
75
See, e.g., R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 371 F. App’x 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2010) (adjudicating an
equal protection claim that a school discriminated based on sex by unduly tolerating student-on-student
harassment); Hill v. Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 203 F. Supp. 3d 871, 880 (E.D. Tenn. 2016) (adjudicating
an equal protection claim alleging that a school district discriminated based on nationality by unduly
tolerating student-on-student harassment); G.D.S. ex rel. Slade v. Northport-East Northport Union Free
Sch. Dist., 915 F. Supp. 2d 268, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (adjudicating an equal protection claim that a
school district discriminated based on religion by unduly tolerating student-on-student harassment).
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To define hostile learning environments for purposes of the First
Amendment discussion that follows, I seize on the third component of the
Davis framework—the component that obliges schools to respond only if
the harassment is “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive . . . that
the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an institution’s
resources and opportunities.”76 One could offer less stringent definitions of
hostile learning environments, of course, but it is best to proceed with the
Davis test in hand. Given the Court’s insistence that offense and outrage are
never independently sufficient bases on which to restrict speech,77 the only
First Amendment conversations worth having about student-on-student
harassment are ones concerning speech that inflicts harm of a different sort.
The Davis formulation satisfies that discussion-framing requirement
because it marks the point at which a related, but analytically distinct, kind
of harm occurs—namely, the denial of equal access to a school’s facilities,
programs, or activities.78 Moreover, as I argue in Part III, the Court is likely
to find that the First Amendment permits public institutions of higher
education to discipline student speakers on hostile-environment grounds
only if that environment is defined in the Davis-centered terms that I seize
upon here.
Given the risk of First Amendment difficulties, one might think that
wise administrators would always respond to student-on-student verbal
harassment in ways that stop well short of constitutional limits. After all,
the Davis Court emphasized that when students harass other students,
school officials have the option to choose from whatever array of
reasonable responses might be available. 79 But avoiding First Amendment
difficulties is not always as easy as that. In addition to the public pressure
that is sometimes brought to bear when allegations of verbal harassment
are publicized—pressure that can push strongly for punitive action against
the speakers80—statutory forces can push school officials to respond to
harassment in ways that test constitutional boundaries. The Sixth Circuit
has said, for example, that when a school “has actual knowledge that its
efforts to remediate [sexual harassment] are ineffective, and it continues to
use those same methods to no avail, such [school] has failed to act
76

Davis, 526 U.S. at 651. I certainly am not the first to define hostile learning environments this
way. See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 2, at 1858 (using the phrase “hostile learning environment” to
describe instances in which harassment rises to the level necessary for federal statutory liability).
77
See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
78
See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
79
See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
80
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (citing sources that provide examples).
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reasonably in light of the known circumstances.” The Fourth Circuit has
similarly explained that a school confronted with persistent sexual
harassment must respond with efforts “reasonably calculated to end [the]
harassment,” rather than stick with remedial responses that have failed to
stem the harassment tide. 82 With such rulings in mind, suppose a university
faced with student-on-student harassment initially chooses a remedial
response that stops short of disciplining the speaker. Perhaps, for example,
the first response consists of a condemnatory email sent by the university’s
president to the campus community. If the harassment continues and is
based on a trait that Congress has singled out for special protection, the
threat of statutory liability may push the school ever closer to a response
that raises First Amendment concerns.
Before turning to those concerns, I should emphasize two final points
regarding the Davis formulation and the statutory context from which it
comes. First, note the Court’s use of the conjunction “and” in the phrase
“severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive.”83 That formulation subtly,
but importantly, differs from the Meritor Savings Bank Court’s finding that
Title VII renders employers liable for hostile work environments when the
harassment is “severe or pervasive.”84 The Davis standard requires both
severity and pervasiveness, while the Meritor Savings Bank standard
requires only one or the other.85 In both settings, the notions of severity and
pervasiveness are deployed in service to Congress’s desire to prevent
specified ends from occurring. In the Title VII context, the goal is to avoid
abusive working environments and discriminatory alterations in employees’
conditions of employment.86 In the context of Title IX and similar
legislation, the goal is to avoid the denial of equal access to school resources
and opportunities.87 In the Court’s judgment, Congress has concluded that
either severity or pervasiveness is sufficient to produce the undesired ends
in the former situation, but both are required to produce the undesired ends
in the latter.88
Even ordinarily reliable narrators nevertheless often use Meritor
Savings Bank’s “or” formulation when describing the statutory standard
81
Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Tesoriero v.
Syosset Cent. Sch. Dist., 382 F. Supp. 2d 387, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (applying Vance).
82
Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 689–91 (4th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original)
(quoting Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655, 669 (2d Cir. 2012)); accord Wills v. Brown
Univ., 184 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that “if [a school] learns that its measures have proved
inadequate, it may be required to take further steps to avoid new liability”).
83
Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999).
84
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (emphasis added); see also supra
notes 13–19 and accompanying text (describing Title VII).
85
Davis, 526 U.S. at 651; Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
86
See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII).
87
See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text (discussing statutory restrictions on federal
funding recipients).
88
Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67; Davis, 526 U.S. at 651.

20

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:1

for student-on-student harassment.89 For some writers, this extension of
the Title VII formulation is probably just the result of inattention. For
others, it is part of a campaign to push the law governing student
harassment toward the “or” formulation, so federal funding recipients can
more easily be held liable when students are harassed based on statutorily
specified traits.90
My use of the Davis Court’s “and” formulation is deliberate. Many
courts have held that the less demanding “or” standard applies when
students sue federal funding recipients under Title IX or similar
legislation for harassment inflicted by school employees.91 That approach
89
There are many examples, but just a sampling will suffice. See, e.g., Doe v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 970
F.3d 1300, 1316 (10th Cir. 2020) (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring) (using the “or” formulation when
discussing Title IX liability); Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 686, 689–91 (4th Cir.
2018) (citing the Davis Court’s “and” formulation but using it interchangeably with its own “or”
formulation); DJ ex rel. Hughes v. Sch. Bd., 488 F. Supp. 3d 307, 332–33 (E.D. Va. 2020) (using the
“or” formulation when discussing both Title VI liability and Title IX liability); Williams v. Lenape Bd.
of Educ., No. 17-7482, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77757, at *43–44 (D.N.J. May 4, 2020) (using the “or”
formulation when discussing Title VI liability); Weckhorst v. Kan. State Univ., 241 F. Supp. 3d 1154,
1164–65 (D. Kan. 2017) (using the “and” and “or” formulations interchangeably when discussing Title
IX liability); Moore v. Chilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 1 F. Supp. 3d 1281, 1292, 1297–98 (M.D. Ala. 2014)
(using the “and” and “or” formulations interchangeably when discussing section 504 liability).
90
In Title IX regulations promulgated in the spring of 2020, the Trump administration’s
Department of Education defined sexual harassment as including “[u]nwelcome conduct determined by
a reasonable person to be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies a person
equal access to the recipient’s education program or activity.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.30(a)(2) (2021) (emphasis
added); see also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026, 30,036 nn.88–89 (May 19, 2020) (explaining the
Department’s decision to use the conjunctive “and” rather than the disjunctive “or”). For a discussion of
the history behind these regulations, see Samantha Harris, A Long Time Coming: The New Title IX
Regulations Take Effect Today, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC. (Aug. 14, 2020),
https://www.thefire.org/a-long-time-coming-the-new-title-ix-regulations-take-effect-today/?utm_sour
ce=FIRE_Update&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Update&show_popup=false. A coalition of
organizations sued, contending that Title VI and section 504 are triggered when harassment is “severe,
pervasive, or objectively offensive” and that the Trump administration should not be allowed to treat
Title IX as triggered only when sexual harassment is “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive.” See
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 20–23, 26–27, Know Your IX v. Devos, No. RDB20-01224 (D. Md. Oct. 20, 2020) (emphasis added). The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education,
the Independent Women’s Law Center, and Speech First, Inc. asked to intervene in order to defend the
position that the conjunctive “and” is necessary to bring the proposed regulations into alignment with
both Davis and the First Amendment. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene as
Defendants at 1, Know Your IX, No. RDB-20-01224 (D. Md. Oct. 20, 2020). On October 20, 2020, the
District Court dismissed the case, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. See Know Your
IX v. Devos, No. RDB-20-01224, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194288, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 20, 2020).
91
See, e.g., Doe v. Pawtucket Sch. Dep’t, 969 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2020); Doe v. Miami Univ.,
882 F.3d 579, 589–90 (6th Cir. 2018); Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633 F.3d
81, 89 (2d Cir. 2011); Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695–96 (4th Cir. 2007); Hendrichsen v.
Ball State Univ., 107 F. App’x 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2004); Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733,
744–45 (2d Cir. 2003); Garcia ex rel. Marin v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1196,
1198 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
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makes good sense. Whether at K-12 schools or at institutions of higher
education, school employees often have multiple forms of institutional
authority over students, and those employees’ power-infused roles are
frequently such that students who wish to take full advantage of school
resources cannot easily avoid entering those employees’ spheres of
influence. When employees take advantage of the resulting opportunities
to harass students, the asymmetrical distribution of power between
students and employees can easily hinder the harassed students’ ability
to protect themselves with self-help remedies.92 So, it is easy to imagine
that when harassment is either severe or pervasive, students will suffer a
loss of equal access to certain aspects of school life. Moreover, public
employers are constitutionally permitted to wield significant control over
the speech of their employees,93 and those employers already monitor
their employees for speech and conduct that amount to harassment under
Title VII’s “or” standard. Given all of these circumstances, it would be
perverse to allow school employees to harass students in ways that would
be impermissible if inflicted on coworkers. It is fitting to oblige schools
to intervene, therefore, when employees’ harassment of students is either
severe or pervasive.
Harassment inflicted on students by other students is a different matter.
Any institutional authority that students hold over one another is typically
not comparable to the authority that teachers, coaches, and administrators
possess. 94 College students come to campus as peers, standing in relation
to one another merely as adults who share a desire to pursue studies at the
given institution. In their dealings with one another, students usually can
be expected to protect themselves with the same kinds of self-help
strategies they use when managing interpersonal conflicts in the larger
92
Cf. Azhar Majeed, The Misapplication of Peer Harassment Law on College and University
Campuses and the Loss of Student Speech Rights, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC. (May 7, 2009),
https://www.thefire.org/the-misapplication-of-peer-harassment-law-on-college-and-university-campuses
-and-the-loss-of-student-speech-rights/ (“Given the power differentials and economic constraints at play
in one’s employment, it is simply not realistic to expect employees to protect themselves against
harassment under a ‘marketplace of ideas’ model.”).
93
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (holding that the First Amendment gives
public employees no protection for speech they utter pursuant to their job responsibilities); Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (adopting a balancing test to determine whether public employers
can respond adversely when their employees speak in their personal capacities on matters of public
concern). The Garcetti Court reserved judgment on whether its rule applies to faculty members’ teaching
and scholarship. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. Lower courts are split on that question. Compare, e.g., Demers
v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 406 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We hold that Garcetti does not apply to speech related to
scholarship or teaching.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), with Ross v. New York, No. 15-CV-3286,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18517, at *20–21 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2016) (holding that an accounting professor
lacked First Amendment protection for his classroom speech because teaching was one of his job
responsibilities).
94
See Majeed, supra note 92 (“Peer harassment in education . . . very rarely involves a power
imbalance element [comparable to what one commonly finds in employer-employee relationships].”). I
am setting to one side the nuances that might arise when one student stands in a supervisory or other
formalized position of power over another student.
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community. Moreover, students at public colleges and universities enjoy
First Amendment rights vis-à-vis their schools that are greater than the
rights enjoyed by those schools’ employees.95 Indeed, broad freedom of
expression is crucial for the educational purposes that bring students to
campus in the first place. 96 Thus, there are good reasons to say that one
college or university student’s speech does not deprive another student of
equal access to school resources and opportunities unless the speech
constitutes harassment of an especially high order. Davis reasonably holds
that student-on-student harassment reaches the access-denying level only
when it is “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive.”97
Finally, there is one significant way in which the federal
antidiscrimination statutes that the Davis standard serves do not constrain
the description of hostile learning environments that I provide here.
Student-on-student harassment can result in a denial of equal access even
when the harassment does not concern race, color, national origin, sex, or
disability—the traits that Title VI, Title IX, and section 504 collectively
single out for protection. Not everyone shares this view. The Foundation
for Individual Rights in Education, for example, would allow universities
to discipline students for their harassing speech only when, among other
things, the harassment concerns an “immutable status,” like race, sex, or
gender identity. 98 But suppose a student at a public university is harassed
95
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (explaining that the First Amendment applies with
as much “force on college campuses [as it does] in the community at large”).
96
See id. at 180–81 (“The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the
marketplace of ideas, and we break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication
to safeguarding academic freedom.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, rather than through
any kind of authoritative selection.”) (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97
Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999).
98
See Model Code of Student Conduct, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC.,
https://www.thefire.org/legal/procedural-advocacy/model-code/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2021). In an earlier
publication, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education took the comparable position that
harassment is actionable only if, among other things, it was “on the basis of a protected status, like gender,
race, disability, or age.” HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, DAVID FRENCH & GREG LUKIANOFF, FOUND. FOR
INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC., FIRE’S GUIDE TO FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 91 (Greg Lukianoff & William
Creeley eds., 2d ed. 2012). Reflecting on his experience drafting a speech code for Stanford University,
Thomas Grey argues that harassment based on “sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation,
and national and ethnic origin” is most worthy of proscription because “these characteristics tend to make
individuals possessing them the target of socially pervasive invidious discrimination.” Thomas C. Grey,
How to Write a Speech Code Without Really Trying: Reflections on the Stanford Experience, 29 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 891, 906 (1996). Even if that is true, it does not mean that harassment based on other traits
is incapable of creating a hostile learning environment. If such harassment does occur, a university might
decide that it ought to bring the harassment to an end and might want to know whether the First
Amendment restricts the ways in which it may do so.
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by a classmate regarding, say, his or her family’s scandals, economic
deprivation, or some other matter to which antidiscrimination statutes do
not speak. There is no reason to stipulate a priori that the harassment
cannot become so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that its
target is denied equal access to resources and opportunities that the
university provides. Even absent a statutory obligation to intervene,
school officials might thus still wish to do so. Does the First Amendment
permit the university to discipline the harasser? We owe the school a
good answer to that question, just as we owe the school a good answer
when it tries to square the First Amendment with its obligations under
Title VI, Title IX, and section 504. What, then, does the First Amendment
say about these matters?
II. FREE-SPEECH ORIGINALISM AND THE MODERN COURT
Given the composition of today’s Court and the rise of originalism as
a favored method of constitutional interpretation,99 one might assume that
the Justices’ answers to our First Amendment inquiries concerning student
speech in public higher education would depend largely upon their
assessment of the Speech Clause’s original meaning and the rights of
college students in early America. The modern Court’s orientation toward
free-speech controversies, however, is decidedly non-originalist in nature.
Understanding the Court’s rejection of key originalist touchstones helps
clarify the challenges that public college and university administrators will
face if they wish to persuade the Court that they may discipline students
for saying things that create hostile learning environments for others.
A. Originalist Touchstones
Despite its ascendance in other constitutional domains, originalism has
been conspicuously noninfluential in the modern Court’s free-speech

99
When the Court interpreted the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570 (2008), for example, the Justices split 5–4 but all nine framed at least some of their arguments in
originalist terms. See id. at 576 (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that the
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal
and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.”) (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); id. at 592 (concluding that the Court’s reading of the Second Amendment “is strongly
confirmed by the historical background of the Second Amendment”); id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that he is guided by the “text” and “history” of the Second Amendment and concluding that
“there is no indication that the Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine the common-law right of
self-defense in the Constitution”). Justice Kagan famously put it this way during her 2010 confirmation
hearings: “[S]ometimes [the framers] laid down very specific rules. Sometimes they laid down broad
principles. Either way we apply what they say, what they meant to do. So in that sense, we are all
originalists.” The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010) (testimony of
Solicitor General Elena Kagan).
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jurisprudence.100 This might be due, in part, to an evidentiary problem: it is
difficult to substantiate nuanced claims about what, precisely, the Speech
Clause did and did not mean to the founding generation.101 There is little
evidence of debate about the freedom of speech in the Congress that
proposed the First Amendment or in the state conventions that ratified it.102
The freedom of the press figured prominently in early Americans’ thinking,
but the freedom of speech as a distinct legal concept lagged far behind.103

100
See Hon. Michael W. McConnell, Free Speech & Election Law: Originalism and the First
Amendment, 2016 National Lawyers Convention, held by the Federalist Society, at 01:02:06 (Nov. 18,
2016) (audio available at https://fedsoc.org/conferences/2016-national-lawyers-convention?#agendaitem-free-speech-election-law-originalism-and-the-first-amendment) [hereinafter Originalism and the
First Amendment] (“It is, I think, true that free speech law has been kind of a desert when it comes to
originalism.”); cf. Derigan Silver & Dan V. Kozlowski, The First Amendment Originalism of Justices
Brennan, Scalia and Thomas, 17 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 385, 402 (2012) (concluding that, between his
appointment in 1986 and the conclusion of the October 2010 Term, Justice Scalia invoked originalism
in only 30.4% of the free-speech opinions he wrote); id. at 408 (concluding that, between his appointment
in 1991 and the conclusion of the October 2010 Term, Justice Thomas invoked originalism in only 29.4%
of the free-speech opinions he wrote).
101
See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 38 (1992) (“[N]o clear, consistent
vision of what the framers meant by freedom of speech will ever emerge.”); Lawrence Rosenthal, First
Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND.
L.J. 1, 27 (2011) (“In the face of . . . deeply conflicting evidence, most scholars of the First Amendment
have despaired of producing any coherent originalist account of the Speech and Press Clauses, at least
when examining the question in terms of the intentions of the framers.”). The Supreme Court was not
pressed to begin developing a detailed Speech Clause jurisprudence until the late nineteenth century since
federal restrictions on expression were rare prior to that time. See Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court
and Freedom of Expression from 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 271 (1986) (“[T]he federal
government did little to provoke litigation over first amendment rights to freedom of speech and the press
until after the Civil War. . . . Thus, not until the 1870’s did Supreme Court decisions on freedom of
expression become more frequent.”) (footnotes omitted).
102
See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 281 (1985) (“[W]e do not know what
the First Amendment’s freedom of speech-and-press clause meant to the men who drafted and ratified it
at the time that they did so.”); 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.5(a) (5th ed. 2013) (“There is little that
anyone can draw . . . from the debates within the House concerning the meaning of the First Amendment.
In addition, there is the absence of useful records of debates in the Senate or the states on its ratification.”)
(footnotes omitted); Rosenthal, supra note 101, at 16 (“After a conference committee agreed on the
Senate version of the Speech and Press Clauses, the proposed amendment passed both Houses and was
sent to the states for ratification without further substantive discussion of the Speech or Press Clauses.
No record survives of the debates in the ratifying states, or of the public discussion of the proposed
amendment.”) (footnotes omitted).
103
See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. R EV. 455, 487 (1983)
(“[F]reedom of speech, unlike freedom of the press, had little history as an independent concept when
the first amendment was framed. . . . Epistemologically, at least, the press clause was primary and the
speech clause secondary.”); id. (“Freedom of the press was neither equated with nor viewed as a
derivative of freedom of speech [at the time of the founding]. Most of the state constitutions protected
freedom of the press, but only one protected speech.”).
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As Robert Bork put it, “The framers . . . appear not to have been overly
concerned with the subject.”104
A more consequentialist explanation for originalism’s small footprint
in modern free-speech law concerns the conclusions to which an originalist
quest for meaning could reasonably lead. I say “could reasonably lead”
because it would be unreasonable to suppose that all originalist analyses
of First Amendment questions would yield identical conclusions.105
Originalism is not a single theory of constitutional interpretation; it is,
rather, a cluster of theories that share a commitment to the propositions
that the meaning of constitutional texts is fixed at the time of adoption and
that this meaning constrains the actions of judges and other government
officials. 106 On just about any contemporary issue, one can find originalists
on opposite sides.107 My aim here is simply to describe conclusions that
the court today could easily reach if guided by originalist lights.
1. Blackstonian Principles
At the time of our country’s founding, a widely held view was that
freedom of expression is among our natural rights, but policymakers can
restrict that freedom in order to serve the interests of society as a whole.108
This view sprang from Blackstone’s description of the English common

104
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22
(1971); accord SMOLLA, supra note 101, at 36 (“[T]here is the high probability that many of those
involved in the adoption of the First Amendment never really focused on the precise meaning of the
principles it embodied at all.”).
105
There is no need here to wade into the debate about the founders’ understanding of the First
Amendment status of speech critical of governmental entities. Compare, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1946) (“The First Amendment was written by men . . . who
intended to wipe out the common law of sedition, and make further prosecutions for criticism of the
government, without any incitement to law-breaking, forever impossible in the United States of
America.”), with LEVY, supra note 102, at xii (“I . . . aim to demolish the proposition formerly accepted
in both law and history that it was the intent of the American Revolution or the Framers of the First
Amendment to abolish the common law of seditious libel.”). Members of the founding generation
themselves disagreed sharply on these matters. See Rosenthal, supra note 101, at 20–21.
106
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6 (2015) (“Contemporary originalism is a family of constitutional theories,
united by two core ideas, fixation and constraint.”). For an introduction to some of the methodological
issues on which originalists today disagree, see Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the
Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 14–18 (2018).
107
Compare, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 715 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, every State limited marriage to one man and one
woman, and no one doubted the constitutionality of doing so. That resolves these cases.”), with Steven
G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648, 654
(2016) (“We conclude that originalism must lead to the conclusion that bans on same-sex marriage are
unconstitutional, and that Obergefell v. Hodges was thereby correctly decided.”).
108
See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 259 (2017)
(“Founding Era constitutionalism allowed for restrictions of natural liberty to promote the public good—
generally defined as the good of the society as a whole. . . . In this sense, speech and press freedoms were
expansive in scope—applying to all forms of expression—but weak in their legal effect.”) (footnotes
omitted).
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law.109 Blackstone explained that government officials could not place prior
restraints upon speech, but they could punish speakers who abused their
resulting freedom to say whatever they wished:
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments
he pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the
freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper,
mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his
own temerity. . . . [T]o punish (as the law does at present)
any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published,
shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious
tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good
order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations
of civil liberty. Thus the will of individuals is still left free;
the abuse only of that free will is the object of legal
punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon
freedom of thought or enquiry: liberty of private sentiment is
still left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad
sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime
which society corrects. 110
In the years immediately following the Revolutionary War and
continuing for more than a century, the Blackstonian view exerted a
powerful influence in America.111 Pennsylvania provides an important
109
See LEVY, supra note 102, at 281 (concluding that, although the evidence is indeterminate, the
best bet is that the founding generation believed the First Amendment’s speech and press clauses
embodied Blackstone’s description of expressive freedoms); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 637–38, 642–
43 (5th ed. 1891) (1833) (approvingly reciting Blackstone’s description of expressive freedoms);
Rosenthal, supra note 101, at 16 (“The use of the definite article at the beginning of [an early draft of the
First Amendment] hints at a reference to a preexisting legal concept, and given the state of framing-era
law, the most likely suspect is Blackstone.”); id. at 32 (“[E]ven in originalist terms, most likely the best
understanding of the Speech and Press Clauses is that they were to create a common law of free speech
and a free press in which competing interests would be put to the balance, rather than dictating particular
outcomes to the process of balancing.”). Cf. SMOLLA, supra note 101, at 33 (arguing that some framers
likely believed the First Amendment embodied the Blackstonian view, while other framers probably
“saw the First Amendment . . . as a departure from English tradition”). Zechariah Chafee launched
perhaps the most famous assault on Blackstone’s relevance to our understanding of the First Amendment.
See CHAFEE, supra note 105, at 18 (“The men of 1791 went as far as Blackstone, and much farther.”).
110
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 189–90 (William G.
Hammond ed., Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1890) (1778) (emphasis added).
111
See Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1247 (Utah 2006) (“As the revolutionary
fervor in the United States cooled . . . the broader ideas about the limits of the freedom of speech right
embodied in the revolutionary constitutions were blunted by the more conservative Blackstone
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example. In 1776, Pennsylvania became the first state to adopt a
constitutional provision protecting the freedom of speech.112 Several other
state constitutions protected the freedom of the press,113 but Pennsylvania
went further, declaring that “the people have a right to freedom of speech,
and of writing, and publishing their sentiments.”114 But when the
commonwealth adopted its 1790 constitution—just one year prior to the
First Amendment’s ratification—it swung unmistakably in Blackstone’s
direction, declaring that “every citizen may freely speak, write and print on
any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”115 In the years
that followed, nearly every state in the Union adopted abuse clauses when
framing or amending their constitutions’ speech provisions.116 Still in place
today,117 these clauses limit the value of state constitutions’ speech
provisions for those asserting expressive freedoms.118
formulation of the freedom of the press.”); SMOLLA, supra note 101, at 33 (“[I]t is quite clear that for at
least some of the framers, freedom of speech went as far as Blackstone and no further.”); Campbell,
supra note 108, at 276 (“Speaking, writing, and publishing were thus ordinarily subject to restrictions
under laws that promoted the public good.”). This did not mean, however, that policymakers could punish
any speech whatsoever. See Campbell, supra note 108, at 260 (stating that the Founders generally agreed
that the government could not “punish well-intentioned statements of one’s thoughts absent direct injury
to others”).
112
See Seth F. Kreimer, The Pennsylvania Constitution’s Protection of Free Expression, 5 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 12, 14–15 (2002).
113
See id. at 15.
114
PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XII; see also Anderson, supra note 103, at 487 (“Most of the state
constitutions protected freedom of the press, but only one protected speech.”).
115
PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § VII (emphasis added); see also Am. Bush, 140 P.3d at 1247 (“In
view of the liberal and unqualified nature of the 1776 clause, the addition of this Blackstonian limitation
is no empty formulation, but represents a shift to a more limited freedom of speech right.”).
116
See Am. Bush, 140 P.3d at 1247 (stating that “the vast majority of the states adopted a
‘responsibility for abuse’ provision”); CHAFEE, supra note 105, at 5 n.2 (reporting that, in 1942, only
five states lacked “abuse” clauses in their constitutions); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 457 n.1 (2d ed. 1871) (quoting all of the speech clauses that then appeared in state
constitutions).
117
Forty-three state constitutions today contain “abuse” provisions in their speech clauses. See 1
JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND
DEFENSES 5-103–5-114 (4th ed. 2006) (quoting all state constitutions’ speech provisions).
118
See, e.g., J.D. v. State, 859 N.E.2d 341, 344 (Ind. 2007) (“Because it obstructed and interfered
with Deputy Gibbons, J.D.’s alleged political speech clearly amounted to an abuse of the right to free
speech and thus subjected her to accountability under Section 9.”); People v. Ford, 773 P.2d 1059, 1066
(Colo. 1989) (“We believe that when the constitutional convention adopted article II, section 10 [of the
Colorado Constitution], it accepted the widely held concept that obscenity was an abuse of the freedom
of speech.”); K. Gordon Murray Prods., Inc. v. Floyd, 125 S.E.2d 207, 212 (Ga. 1962) (“The decisions
of this court clearly show that an ‘abuse of that liberty’ as expressed in our Constitution does not come
within the speech or press which is protected.”). In my home state of Iowa, the constitution’s speech
clause opens with language that plainly echoes the text adopted in Pennsylvania more than two centuries
ago: “Every person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that right.” IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7. As a result, Iowa’s speech clause is rarely invoked by
free speech claimants today. See TODD E. PETTYS, THE IOWA STATE CONSTITUTION 80 (2d ed. 2018)
(explaining that Iowa’s free speech provision plays virtually no role in constitutional litigation today).
Early rulings in the nation’s history made clear the kinds of conclusions these abuse clauses could yield.
See, e.g., People v. Most, 64 N.E. 175, 176–78 (N.Y. 1902) (upholding the conviction of a man who had
“endangered the public peace” by urging revolution, and emphasizing that New York’s constitution left
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Blackstone’s influence extended beyond the framing of state
constitutions; he shaped many people’s understanding of the natural rights
protected by the First Amendment, as well.119 Lawrence Rosenthal observes,
for example, that “leading commentators in the first half of the nineteenth
century hewed to Blackstone, explaining that the First Amendment
preserved the common law and accordingly prohibited only prior
restraints.”120 Joseph Story was one of those writers, explaining in his 1833
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States that it was “too wild”
to be believed that the First Amendment gave “every citizen an absolute
right to speak, or write, or print whatever he might please, without any
responsibility, public or private.”121 In Story’s view, punishing speakers for
their “dangerous or offensive” communications was
necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of
government and religion,—the only solid foundations of civil
liberty. Thus, the will of individuals is still left free; the abuse
only of that free will is the object of legal punishment. . . . A
man may be allowed to keep poisons in his closet, but not
publicly to vend them as cordials.122
Blackstone’s influence in federal quarters was still being felt in the early
1900s.123 Consider, for example, Justice Holmes’s opinion for the Court in
the legislature free to prescribe punishments for those who abused their expressive freedom);
Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. 206, 219 (1838) (refusing to invalidate Massachusetts’s
blasphemy statute because the Massachusetts constitution left “every citizen responsible for any offence
capable of being committed by the use of language”); People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 294–95 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1811) (upholding a blasphemy conviction because the speaker’s utterances about Jesus Christ
and his mother were “a gross violation of decency and good order” and “an abuse of” the freedom to talk
about religious matters).
119
See LEVY, supra note 102, at xv (“[T]he intentions of the framers were not the most libertarian
and their insights on the subject of freedom of expression not the most edifying. But this should be
expected because the Framers were nurtured on . . . the narrow conservatism of Blackstone.”); id. at 16
(“The American people [at the time of the founding] simply did not believe or understand that freedom
of thought and expression means equal freedom for the other person, especially the one with hated
ideas.”).
120
Rosenthal, supra note 101, at 23; see also id. at 24 (“[B]y the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification, developments in First Amendment jurisprudence had not been dramatic.”).
121
STORY, supra note 109, at 634–35.
122
Id. at 638. In the passage quoted here, he speaks specifically about publications, but he explains
a few pages earlier that a person has a “right to speak . . . his opinions upon any subject whatsoever,
without any prior restraint,” but may be punished if his or her speech “injure[s] any other person” or
“disturb[s] the public peace.” Id. at 635.
123
See Campbell, supra note 108, at 259 (“Although perhaps strange to modern readers, this
[Blackstonian] interpretation of the First Amendment—generally permitting the government to restrict
speech in the public interest—survived into the early twentieth century.”).
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Patterson v. Colorado. Thomas Patterson had been held in criminal
contempt for publishing materials that criticized the Colorado Supreme
Court.125 He argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
brought the First Amendment’s Speech Clause to bear on state officials,
but—on Blackstonian grounds—the Court found it unnecessary to resolve
that issue:
[E]ven if we were to assume that freedom of speech and freedom
of the press were protected from abridgment on the part not only
of the United States but also of the States, still we should be far
from the conclusion that the plaintiff in error would have us
reach. . . . [T]he main purpose of such constitutional provisions is
“to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had
been practiced by other governments,” and they do not prevent
the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary
to the public welfare.126
If today’s Court were firmly committed to originalism and concluded
that the First Amendment should be understood in Blackstonian terms, the
Court would likely find that public officials may prescribe punishments for
specified categories of speech when they reasonably believe doing so will
promote the public good. It would be only a small step from there to the
conclusion that the First Amendment leaves administrators at public colleges
and universities free to discipline students whose speech creates a hostile
learning environment for others.127
2. College Students’ Rights in Early America
Even if an originalism-driven Court did not wed itself to Blackstone, it
still could easily find it appropriate to uphold speech restrictions on college
and university students. Justice Thomas’s own jurisprudential views point
toward that conclusion. Two examples illustrate the point, with the first
providing context for the more relevant second. In McKee v. Cosby,128 the
Court denied certiorari in a defamation dispute concerning the public-figure
status of a woman who accused Bill Cosby of rape.129 Justice Thomas
124

205 U.S. 454 (1907).
Id. at 458–59.
126
Id. at 462 (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313–14 (1825)). The
Court assumed the Speech Clause’s incorporation sixteen years later. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925).
127
I do not ask here whether administrators could act upon such calculations on their own authority
or whether they would need the approval of state lawmakers. See generally Campbell, supra note 108, at
257 (arguing that, at the time of the founding, many believed the First Amendment provided “broad
latitude for the people and their representatives to determine which regulations of expression would
promote the public good”) (emphasis added).
128
139 S. Ct. 675 (2019).
129
For the facts of the case and the parties’ various contentions, see McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54
(1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019).
125
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concurred in the denial of certiorari but signaled that, in a future case, the
Court should critically revisit New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,130 one of the
most influential First Amendment rulings of the past century.131 The Sullivan
Court famously ruled that public officials suing speakers for defamation
cannot prevail unless they demonstrate that the speakers uttered their
defamatory statements with “actual malice.”132 In later rulings, the Justices
extended that rule to defamation suits brought by nongovernmental public
figures.133 Justice Thomas argued that Sullivan and its progeny were
troublingly out of step with “the First Amendment as it was understood by
the people who ratified it.”134 In his view, the Court should consider moving
toward legal principles that make it far more perilous to criticize those who
hold prominent positions in public life:
The common law of libel at the time the First and Fourteenth
Amendments were ratified did not require public figures to
satisfy any kind of heightened liability standard as a condition
of recovering damages. . . . Far from increasing a public
figure’s burden in a defamation action, the common law deemed
libels against public figures to be, if anything, more serious and
injurious than ordinary libels.135
If one believes that the First Amendment does not provide much
protection for those who speak disparagingly about public figures, might it
do better for students saying things that school administrators find
problematic? In Justice Thomas’s view, it does not. In the 2007 decision
Morse v. Frederick,136 the Court held that a high school student did not have
a First Amendment right to display a banner declaring “BONG HiTS 4
130

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 682 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari); accord Frank B.
Cross, The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and Citations, 97 IOWA L. REV. 693, 735 (2012) (listing
Sullivan just after Brown v. Board of Education in a list of the Court’s most influential liberal opinions).
132
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
133
See, e.g., Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 133 n.† (1967) (noting the composition of
the majority on this point).
134
McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 676 (Thomas, J., concurring).
135
Id. at 678–79. For a recent critique of Sullivan on different grounds, see David A. Logan,
Rescuing Our Democracy by Rethinking New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 759 (2020)
(arguing that, due to changes in communications technologies and platforms, falsehoods now present
problems that the Sullivan Court did not anticipate). Citing Logan heavily, Justice Gorsuch has said—
without committing to a position on the merits—that he believes changes in the media landscape since
1964 likely necessitate taking a second look at Sullivan. Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2427–28
(2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
136
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
131
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JESUS” at a school-sponsored event. The majority reached its conclusion
only after carefully discussing the Court’s landmark decision in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District.138 Tinker held that
high school students had a First Amendment right to protest the Vietnam
War by wearing black armbands to school because there was no evidence
that their expression threatened to substantially disrupt school activities.139
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion in Morse, arguing that Tinker “is
without basis in the Constitution” and that his colleagues in the majority thus
need not have worried about its implications.140 “As originally understood,”
Justice Thomas wrote, “the Constitution does not afford students a right to
free speech in public schools.”141 Although he was focusing primarily on
K-12 students, he indicated that his narrow understanding of students’
speech rights extends, at least to some degree, to higher education:
Even at the college level, strict obedience was required of
students [at the time of the founding]: “The English model
fostered absolute institutional control of students by faculty
both inside and outside the classroom. At all the early
American schools, students lived and worked under a vast
array of rules and restrictions. This one-sided relationship
between the student and the college mirrored the situation at
English schools where the emphasis on hierarchical authority
stemmed from medieval Christian theology and the unique
legal privileges afforded the university corporation.”142
Justice Thomas’s description of college students’ slender prerogatives
in early America enjoys strong support in the historical record. As Glenn
Altschuler and Isaac Kramnick colorfully put it, the nation’s first century
was “the golden age of in loco parentis” at American colleges and
universities, with “academic regulations cover[ing] virtually all aspects of

137

Id. at 397, 409–10.
393 U.S. 503 (1969); see also Morse, 551 U.S. at 403–08 (discussing Tinker and related
authorities). For recent reflections on Tinker and free speech disputes in higher education, see Christina
Bohannan, On the 50th Anniversary of Tinker v. Des Moines: Toward a Positive View of Free Speech
on College Campuses, 105 IOWA L. REV. 2233 (2020).
139
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513–14.
140
Morse, 551 U.S. at 410 (Thomas, J., concurring).
141
Id. at 418–19 (Thomas, J., concurring). For criticism of Justice Thomas’s argument, see Matthew
D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, Contrasting Concurrences of Clarence Thomas: Deploying Originalism and
Paternalism in Commercial and Student Speech Cases, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 321, 341–46 (2010)
(arguing that Justice Thomas’s conclusions are weakly grounded because public education did not arrive
on the scene until the latter half of the nineteenth century and because the First Amendment constrained
only the federal government prior to the twentieth century).
142
Morse, 551 U.S. at 412 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Brian Jackson, Note, The
Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and Proposal for Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV.
1135, 1140 (1991)).
138
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students’ lives, from libido to laundry.”143 In 1891, for instance, the Supreme
Court of Illinois described schools’ power in sweeping terms and found no
constitutional difficulty with a state university’s expulsion of a student who
refused to attend chapel services:
By voluntarily entering the university, or being placed there by
those having the right to control him, he necessarily surrenders
very many of his individual rights. How his time shall be
occupied; what his habits shall be; his general deportment; that
he shall not visit certain places; his hours of study and
recreation,—in all these matters, and many others, he must yield
obedience to those who, for the time being, are his masters . . . .144
Some colleges and universities loosened their grip on students in the latter
half of the nineteenth century,145 but the move in that direction was not swift.
For example, in its 1913 ruling in Gott v. Berea College146—a case
concerning a private college’s refusal to allow students to patronize a
particular restaurant—the Kentucky Court of Appeals found that “[c]ollege
authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral welfare,
and mental training of the pupils.”147 The court said it was “unable to see
why . . . [college leaders] may not make any rule or regulation for the government
or betterment of their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose.”148
143
Glenn C. Altschuler & Isaac Kramnick, A Better Idea Has Replaced ‘In Loco Parentis’, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 5, 1999), https://www.chronicle.com/article/a-better-idea-has-replaced-in-locoparentis; accord Timothy J. Tracey, The Demise of Equal Access and a Return to the Early-American
Understanding of Student Rights, 43 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 557, 563 (2013) (“[T]he idea that students
could use the First Amendment to veto university decisions is a recent phenomenon, and not one that
early-American universities would have understood.”).
144
North v. Bd. of Trs., 27 N.E. 54, 56 (Ill. 1891).
145
See Jackson, supra note 142, at 1141–43; see also Kelly Sarabyn, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment:
Resolving the Federal Circuit Split Over College Students’ First Amendment Rights, 14 TEX. J. ON C.L.
& C.R. 27, 50 (2008) (“In the late nineteenth century, the American university had started to change its
focus from molding and training students to cutting-edge research. . . . An institution focused on obtaining
new truths, rather than on training youth, necessarily has a different relationship to its students.”).
146
161 S.W. 204 (Ky. 1913).
147
Id. at 206.
148
Id. The ensuing shift to the modern era—an era in which students’ legal rights are taken far more
seriously—was heralded by the Fifth Circuit’s influential ruling in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). The Dixon court held that public institutions of higher education
cannot expel students without affording those students meaningful procedural protections. Id. at 158–59.
That decision helped trigger a series of student-protecting rulings that extended across many legal fronts.
See Tracey, supra note 143, at 623 (“With the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Dixon v. Alabama State Board
of Education, the law turned 180 degrees on the issue of student rights.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); id. at 624 (“Dixon became the cornerstone of student-university litigation throughout the 1960s
and 1970s, and effectively struck the finishing blow to the in loco parentis doctrine.”); Carol L. Zeiner,
Zoned Out! Examining Campus Speech Zones, 66 LA. L. REV. 1, 13 (2005) (“Most university law
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Whether Blackstone and early American history are taken separately
or together, it is not difficult to predict where our journey might take us if
we deployed them as our chief guides for the issues under discussion here.
They could carry us quickly to the conclusion that public colleges and
universities may discipline student speakers when administrators
reasonably determine that those students have expressed themselves in
ways contrary to important institutional values and objectives.
B. The Modern Court’s Non-Originalist Jurisprudence
As the reader undoubtedly is aware, the First Amendment rules
under which we live today are far removed from those I have just
described. An unwavering commitment to Blackstonian principles, for
example, would necessitate a revolution in how we understand our First
Amendment rights today. 149 The modern Court holds that the First
Amendment largely strips policymakers of the power to restrict speech
based upon their own assessments of the common good. The Court has
not entirely barred public officials from imposing speech restrictions
that accord with their public-interest calculations, but any such
restrictions draw great judicial skepticism.
Consider, for example, the Court’s 2010 opinion in United States v.
Stevens. 150 Responding to the stomach-turning world of “crush
videos”—videos depicting women crushing small animals beneath their
feet—Congress made it a crime to create, sell, or possess depictions of
animal cruelty for commercial gain. 151 Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Roberts rejected the Federal Government’s “startling and
dangerous” contention that a legislature may proscribe a category of
speech if it concludes that the category’s “social costs” outweigh its
benefits. 152 (Note how far from Blackstone we have traveled. What once
was widely regarded as a legislative prerogative153 is now a “startling and
dangerous” proposition.) The Court acknowledged that there might be
“some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but
have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case
law.”154 The Justices, however, resolved not to use “the Government’s
commentators view Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education as the decision that set the stage for the
demise of in loco parentis.”) (footnotes omitted).
149
See SMOLLA, supra note 101, at 32 (“If Blackstone’s view of free speech was the real original
meaning of the First Amendment, then arguably [ninety] percent of modern free speech jurisprudence . . . is
intellectually dishonest and historically illegitimate.”); Campbell, supra note 108, at 256 (“If the Supreme
Court wanted to apply only those legal rules [concerning free speech] that the Founders recognized (or likely
would have recognized), a huge swath of modern case law would have to go.”).
150
559 U.S. 460 (2010).
151
Id. at 464–66.
152
Id. at 470.
153
See supra Part II.A.1.
154
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
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highly manipulable balancing test as a means of identifying them.”155 The
Chief Justice explained:
The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not
extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc
balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First
Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American
people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government
outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt
to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech
is not worth it. The Constitution is not a document
“prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be
passed at pleasure.”156
As we have seen, that account of early Americans’ understanding of the
First Amendment is, to a large degree, likely apocryphal.157 But it is an account
to which the Court is now tightly bound. One year after Stevens, for example,
the Court issued its ruling in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association,158 striking down a California law that barred the sale or rental of
violent video games to minors.159 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
reiterated Stevens’s anti-Blackstonian insistence that the First Amendment
does not leave lawmakers free to punish or otherwise restrict speech based
upon their assessment of how best to serve the common good.160 Although
embracing an analytic framework that is itself ahistorical in its suppositions,
the Court said that the fate of policymakers’ categorical judgments about
speech depends primarily upon an historical inquiry. Justice Scalia wrote,
“[W]ithout persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a
long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription, a legislature may
not revise the ‘judgment [of] the American people,’ embodied in the First
Amendment, ‘that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh
the costs.’”161 The First Amendment strips policymakers of the power to make
155

Id.
Id. at 470 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803)).
157
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing Blackstonian principles); Campbell, supra note 108, at 257
(“[T]he First Amendment did not enshrine a judgment that the costs of restricting expression outweigh
the benefits. At most, it recognized only a few established rules, leaving broad latitude for the people and
their representatives to determine which regulations of expression would promote the public good.”).
158
564 U.S. 786 (2011).
159
Id. at 789, 805.
160
Id. at 790–91.
161
Id. at 792 (alteration in original) (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470); see also id. at 795
(“California’s argument would fare better if there were a longstanding tradition in this country of
specially restricting children’s access to depictions of violence, but there is none.”).
156
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categorical content-based judgments about speech, in other words, unless
those judgments align with judgments that policymakers have long made.
Public colleges and universities are not exempt from this skeptical
disposition toward speech restrictions. As I noted earlier, the Court has said
that the First Amendment applies on public campuses with as much rigor as
in society at large.162 Consider, for example, the Court’s 1973 ruling in
Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri,163 a case
concerning a state university’s expulsion of a journalism student who
distributed a newspaper containing the word “mother-fucker” and depicting
police officers raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice.164
The Eighth Circuit had upheld the expulsion, reasoning that “no provision
of the Constitution requires the imposition of so high a value on freedom of
expression that it can never be subordinated to other interests such as, for
example, the conventions of decency in the use and display of language and
pictures on a University campus.”165 The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning would
fly with the Supreme Court thirteen years later in a case concerning K-12
schools,166 but it did not fly with the Papish Court for university students.
Reversing the ruling below, the Court stressed that “the mere dissemination
of ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state university
campus may not be shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’”167
When it comes to student speech that creates hostile learning
environments, where does this leave public colleges and universities?
Absent a categorical exception of the kind I defend in Part III, our analysis
162
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text
(noting Healy).
163
410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam).
164
See id. at 667–68.
165
Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 464 F.2d 136, 145 (8th Cir. 1972), rev’d, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per
curiam).
166
See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681, 683 (1986) (explaining that the
“highly appropriate function[s] of public [K–12] school[s]” include “teaching students the boundaries of
socially appropriate behavior”; teaching children to speak in ways that accommodate “the sensibilities
of others” by “disfavor[ing] the use of terms of debate [that others may find] highly offensive”; and
equipping students with “‘the habits and manners of civility . . . [that are] indispensable to the practice
of self-government in the community and the nation’”) (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD,
THE BEARDS’ NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). That does not mean K–12
officials can always restrict speech merely because some may find it unpleasant. As the Court later
pointed out, “much political and religious speech [by schoolchildren] might be perceived as offensive to
some” yet will nevertheless enjoy the First Amendment’s protection. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,
409 (2007). Some may have been offended by John and Mary Beth Tinker’s black-armband protest of
the Vietnam War, for example, but their speech was nevertheless constitutionally shielded from
restriction by school officials. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504, 514
(1969). But the First Amendment does not strip elementary and secondary schools of their power to
regulate student speech in ways that take appropriate account of “the special characteristics of the school
environment.” Id. at 506. In Fraser itself, for example, the Court concluded that officials at a public high
school had not violated the First Amendment when they disciplined a student for giving a sexually crude
(but non-obscene) speech at a school assembly. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
167
Papish, 410 U.S. at 670; see also id. at 671 (stating that “the First Amendment leaves no room
for the operation of a dual standard in the academic community with respect to the content of speech”).
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presumably would run as follows. Disciplining students for speaking in ways
that create hostile learning environments for others is a content-based
regulation of speech because the decision to impose discipline is based upon
the effects of the speech’s content on others.168 Imposing such discipline at
a public institution of higher education is thus permissible only if it can
withstand strict scrutiny.169 When dealing with hostile learning
environments of the access-denying sort described in Part I.B, a school may
confidently predict that courts will share administrators’ judgment that
compelling interests are at stake.170 The more difficult case-by-case
challenge will be to establish that discipline—rather than some less
aggressive response—is necessary to restore the harassment victim’s access
to the resources and opportunities that the school provides.171 Indeed, when
the harassment concerns a trait that Congress has singled out for
protection,172 school officials may face a conundrum. Recall the Davis
Court’s observation that, because Congress has not specified particular antiharassment measures that schools must deploy when students are harassed
by classmates, there might be a variety of statutorily acceptable ways in
which schools may respond.173 The range of remedial possibilities that a
168
Cf. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (finding that a restriction on picketing outside
foreign embassies was a content-based restriction on speech because it was based upon the perceived
“need to protect the dignity of foreign diplomatic personnel by shielding them from speech that is critical
of their governments”).
169
See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (“Because the Act imposes a
restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes
strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn
to serve that interest.”); see also United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (“It is rare
that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.”).
170
See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Certainly,
preventing discrimination in the workplace—and in the schools—is not only a legitimate, but a
compelling, government interest.”).
171
Courts frequently find that content-based speech restrictions are not the least restrictive means
of achieving the government’s objectives. See, e.g., Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. at 816–27 (regarding
means of shielding children from indecent material on television); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879–
80 (1997) (regarding means of shielding children from indecent material on the internet). Of course, there
are additional ways that content-based laws can fail narrow-tailoring analysis. Sometimes, for example,
courts strike down content-based restrictions because they are under-inclusive. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387, 395–96 (1992) (striking down content-based distinctions made within a
category of wholly proscribable speech because the government could have proscribed the entire
category). Other times, a law’s under-inclusivity weakens the government’s argument that a contentbased restriction is truly intended to achieve the objective that the government touts as compelling. See,
e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171–72 (2015) (holding that the under-inclusivity of a
town’s content-based sign restrictions fatally undercut the town’s argument that the restrictions were
designed to reduce driver distractions).
172
See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text (discussing federal antidiscrimination
legislation).
173
See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text (discussing that portion of the Davis ruling).
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school may emphasize when trying to deflect a harassment victim’s threat
of statutory repercussions for not responding in the victim’s preferred
manner is the same range of remedial possibilities that an accused harasser
may emphasize when arguing that harsh discipline is not necessary to restore
the victim’s equal access to school programs, activities, and facilities.174
That conundrum is not insoluble, but the difficulties it presents
underscore the importance of asking whether, as a categorical matter,
student speech creating hostile learning environments enjoys no greater First
Amendment protection than fighting words, true threats, or other varieties
of wholly proscribable expression.175 We turn to that possibility now.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT SCENARIOS
In the discussion that follows, I use four brief scenarios to advance
several constitutional arguments concerning hostile learning environments
of the access-denying kind described in Part I.B. I argue that schools may
not discipline student speakers in a preemptive bid to ward off hostile
learning environments that might be in the offing but have not yet
materialized. But, for reasons involving both tradition and free-speech
values, the First Amendment poses no obstacle to discipline once a student
has indeed harassed a classmate to such a degree that the classmate is
denied equal access to school resources and opportunities. When the
hostile environment is created not by one harasser whose speech is
independently sufficient to deprive a classmate of equal access, but by
multiple speakers who each add a few bricks to the harassment wall, or is
created by speech that the harassment victim merely overhears, courts
should rule that the First Amendment shields the student speakers from
discipline unless they made their harassing statements with a mens rea akin
to that of actual malice in defamation law.
A. Four Scenarios
Consider four scenarios involving student speakers and their
classmates at a public college or university. I use the term “classmates”
here simply to refer to students who attend the same school, regardless of
whether they are enrolled with the speakers in the same courses. In each
scenario, I assume that the harassing speech does not take the form of
fighting words, true threats, or any other variety of speech that the Court
174
Cf. Doe v. Univ. of Ill., 138 F.3d 653, 679 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C. J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc) (“Liability for failing to prevent or rectify sexual harassment of one student
by another places a school on a razor’s edge, since the remedial measures that it takes against the alleged
harasser are as likely to expose the school to a suit by him as a failure to take those measures would be
to expose the school to a suit by the victim of the alleged harassment.”).
175
See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text (discussing categories of wholly proscribable
speech).
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has already deemed wholly proscribable. 176 With that assumption in place,
we can focus on whether the First Amendment permits administrators to
discipline students for the very reason that their speech has created a
hostile learning environment for other students on campus.
Scenario One: Student Speaker makes a statement to Classmate. The
statement does not create a hostile learning environment for Classmate, but
Classmate would indeed suffer a loss of equal access to the school’s
programs, activities, or facilities if statements of that type were to pervade
Classmate’s campus experience. Even if the speech concerns a
congressionally specified trait, federal antidiscrimination legislation does
not oblige the school to intervene because Student Speaker’s speech has
not caused Classmate to suffer a loss of equal access to school resources
and opportunities. 177 But suppose campus officials wish to discipline
Student Speaker anyway in a preemptive bid to ensure that such speech
does not become commonplace. Does the First Amendment bar them from
doing so?
Scenario Two: Student Speaker repeatedly makes statements to
Classmate like the statement made in Scenario One, and those statements
collectively constitute severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive
harassment. 178 If the statements concern a congressionally protected trait,
school officials are statutorily obliged to respond in a reasonable
manner. 179 Regardless of whether the harassment does indeed concern a
statutorily specified trait, school officials wish to discipline Student
Speaker for his or her speech. Does the First Amendment bar them from
doing so? If not, why not?
Scenario Three: Student Speaker has made numerous statements to
Classmate like the statement made in Scenario One, but they collectively
fall just short of severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment.
Along comes Second Student Speaker, who makes the same kind of
statement to Classmate. Second Student Speaker’s statement is the last
straw. Classmate is now suffering a denial of equal access by virtue of the
hostile learning environment that the two student speakers’ statements,

176

See id.
See supra Part I.B (discussing schools’ federal statutory obligations).
178
Cf. Foster v. Bd. of Regents, 982 F.3d 960, 962–63 (6th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (addressing
allegations that one student persistently harassed another).
179
See supra Part I.B (discussing schools’ federal statutory obligations).
177
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taken together, have created.
The institution’s statutory obligations
remain clear: if the institution knows about the harassment and the
harassment concerns a trait that Congress has identified for protection, the
institution must respond to the harassment in a reasonable manner. 181 But
what should we say about the First Amendment? Arguably, both Student
Speaker and Second Student Speaker stand in the same position as Student
Speaker in Scenario One—namely, they have made statements that do not
independently create a hostile learning environment for Classmate. If we
say that the speech in Scenario One enjoys the First Amendment’s full
protection, should we say the same about the speech of both student
speakers here? Or does each student speaker’s constitutional susceptibility
to discipline change by virtue of the other’s speech?
Scenario Four: In each of the prior scenarios, the student speakers
directed their statements to Classmate. Suppose that, in Scenarios Two and
Three, the speakers were not directing their comments to Classmate, but
Classmate nevertheless overheard what they said. 182 Does that factual
difference affect our constitutional analysis?
B. Scenario One: Preemptive Discipline
The first scenario does not require extended analysis, but it helps
establish a baseline that will aid discussion of the others. Here, Student
Speaker has made one statement to Classmate and that statement does not
amount to severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment. The
statement might deeply offend Classmate, but offense alone is a
constitutionally inadequate basis on which to deem the speech
unprotected. 183 Because Classmate has not suffered a denial of equal access
to the school’s programs, activities, or facilities, there is no harm that
would constitutionally justify discipline. Permitting the school to take
adverse action against Student Speaker because that individual or others
might later speak to Classmate in similar ways would give campus officials
unacceptably broad authority to impose content-based speech restrictions
on the strength of speculative what-ifs. Justice Kennedy may have had just
such situations in mind when he dissented in Davis. Although his chief

180
Cf. Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 684–85 (4th Cir. 2018) (discussing
harassment that female students at the University of Mary Washington suffered at the hands of multiple
students).
181
See supra Part I.B (discussing schools’ federal statutory obligations).
182
Cf. Adam Steinbaugh, University of Connecticut Police Arrest Students for Use of Racial Slur,
FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC. (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.thefire.org/university-of-connecticutpolice-arrest-students-for-use-of-racial-slur/ (“Two students at the University of Connecticut were
arrested Monday by the University of Connecticut Police Department for saying the N-word loudly
enough for others to hear.”).
183
See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text (discussing this principle).
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concern lay elsewhere, 184 Justice Kennedy cautioned that the Court’s
ruling would “add fuel to the debate over campus speech codes that, in the
name of preventing a hostile educational environment, may infringe
students’ First Amendment rights.”185
It is one thing to burden speech when it creates demonstrable harms;
it is quite another to burden speech based on fears about harms that will
not materialize in the absence of additional speech that might not ever
occur. Consider, for example, the categories of expression that the Court
has long said are wholly proscribable. An utterance typically falls within
one of those categories only when that utterance itself is sufficient to
create the harm that renders such speech proscribable in the first place.
For example, speech amounts to incitement only if the utterance itself “is
likely to incite or produce [imminent lawless] action”;186 speech amounts
to fighting words only if the utterance itself is “inherently likely to
provoke violent reaction”;187 and speech amounts to defamation only if
the utterance itself harms others’ reputations.188 In addition, the First
Amendment permits governments to punish those who issue a true threat
because of the disruptive fear that the utterance itself can instill,189 and
governments may ban the creation and distribution of child pornography
because of the harms that the creation and distribution of such materials
inflict upon the children involved.190 In none of these instances do we say
that speech is proscribable because, if combined with speech of the same
type that might or might not occur in the future, it would create harms
justifying its proscription.
This does not mean that administrators and other members of the
campus community must stand idly by after Student Speaker makes the
statement to Classmate. They can condemn the statement as antithetical to
campus values, for example, and advise Student Speaker about the harms
that continued expressions of that sort might inflict. As we will see when
discussing Scenario Three, 191 advising Student Speaker in this way can
184
See supra note 56 (explaining that Justice Kennedy and his colleagues in dissent believed
Congress had not sufficiently put states on notice of the consequences that would flow from accepting
Title IX funds).
185
Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 682 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added); see also supra Part I.B (discussing Davis).
186
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
187
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
188
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 734 (2012) (“Defamation statutes focus upon
statements of a kind that harm the reputation of another or deter third parties from association or dealing
with the victim.”).
189
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (describing this harm).
190
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758–59 (1982) (describing these harms).
191
See infra Part III.D.
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help lay a foundation for a more punitive response if he or she continues
to speak to Classmate in problematic ways that, by virtue of their
combination with the speech of other students, create a hostile learning
environment. But if the worst we can say about Student Speaker’s
statement is that it would inhibit Classmate’s school access if it became
commonplace, then Student Speaker’s speech has not yet caused an injury
that would constitutionally justify discipline.
C. Scenario Two: The Single-Handed Harasser
In Scenario Two, Student Speaker has single-handedly created a
hostile learning environment for Classmate by making statements that
cumulatively amount to harassment so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that Classmate no longer has equal access to school programs or
other resources. Does the First Amendment shield Student Speaker from
discipline? No, it does not.
One thin argument that some might think points to this conclusion
flows from the subdued nature of the Davis Court’s references to First
Amendment concerns when it extracted the “severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive” formulation from Title IX.192 Joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas in dissent, Justice
Kennedy briefly flagged First Amendment worries, particularly with
respect to speech on college and university campuses. 193 The majority did
not see fit to reply, other than to say that it would be reasonable for schools
to avoid responding to harassment in ways that could provoke
“constitutional or statutory claims” and that a college or university “might
not . . . be expected to exercise the same degree of control over its students
that a grade school would enjoy.”194 If the Justices in the majority believed
Title IX’s standard would sharply collide with the First Amendment
whenever access-denying harassment takes the form of speech and schools
want to impose discipline as a remedy, they signaled those concerns in a
remarkably lowkey way. Just as some argue that the Court’s silence about
First Amendment issues tells us all we need to know about the
constitutional status of speech that creates hostile work environments,195
one might thus argue that the Davis Court’s failure to say more about First

192
Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649–51 (1999); see also supra notes 51-71
and accompanying text (discussing Davis).
193
He pointed out that the First Amendment allows public colleges and universities only limited
control over students’ speech, Davis, 526 U.S. at 667–68 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and he feared that
the Court’s ruling would “add fuel to the debate over campus speech codes that, in the name of preventing
a hostile educational environment, may infringe students’ First Amendment rights,” id. at 682; see also
supra note 56 and accompanying text (noting Justice Kennedy’s dissent).
194
Davis, 526 U.S. at 649.
195
See supra note 35 and accompanying text (noting such arguments).
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Amendment issues tells us all we need to know about student speech that
creates hostile learning environments.
But this is an uncertain and ultimately unhelpful path to take. The
Court did briefly acknowledge the First Amendment’s relevance in this
realm, and the dispute in Davis did not require it to say more than that. In
any event, speculative arguments based on judicial silence do little to
deepen our understanding of “the supreme Law of the Land”196 and its
jurisprudential underpinnings. The day will come when the Supreme Court
speaks directly to the First Amendment status of harassing speech and,
when it does, any disagreements among the Justices will not principally
turn on the significance attached to the fleeting nature of the Davis Court’s
references to constitutional concerns. The Justices will speak directly to
the merits of the issue, and so should we.
A different approach that some might initially find appealing would be
to argue that Student Speaker’s speech should simply be regarded as
conduct. That argument would run something like this: (1) The law would
not allow Student Speaker to physically block Classmate from accessing
campus facilities or other resources; (2) Student Speaker is accomplishing,
through speech, what the law would not permit him or her to accomplish
through conduct; and so (3) Student Speaker’s speech is just conduct, and it
thus lies beyond the First Amendment’s protection.197 Those making such
an argument may emphasize that school officials are targeting Student
Speaker’s speech not because they object to the message it conveys, but
because Student Speaker has stripped Classmate of equal access to campus
programs and the like.198 So, one might conclude that Student Speaker is
entitled to no more constitutional protection than would be available if he or
she had stripped Classmate of equal access by physical means.
That is not the path I take here. As Eugene Volokh writes, “[W]hen
speech is restricted because of harms caused by its content, we ought not
try to evade the First Amendment problem by simply renaming the speech
196
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
197
Cf., e.g., Wirenius, supra note 37, at 907 (arguing that verbal sexual harassment in the workplace
is “a ‘verbal act,’ an act [that is] performed through speech and thus remains outside the boundaries of
First Amendment protection, not based upon governmental disapproval of the speech in question but
because those words spoken in the particular factual context have the effect of an act, not of a
communication”).
198
Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992) (finding that the First Amendment
permits content-based distinctions within realms of wholly proscribable speech when “there is no realistic
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot”).
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‘conduct.’” Here in Scenario Two, there is no avoiding the fact that
Classmate’s lack of equal access flows from the contents of Student
Speaker’s speech, and there is no alchemical process by which Student
Speaker’s speech ceases to be speech such by virtue of the fact that he or
she could have inflicted the same harm by non-expressive means. 200 The
First Amendment protects the freedom of speech, so we need to confront
the possibility of First Amendment protection head-on.
For at least two reasons, the Court should conclude, as a categorical
matter, that when a student at a public college or university verbally
harasses a classmate so severely, pervasively, and objectively offensively
that the classmate is denied equal access to school facilities or other
resources, the speech falls beyond the First Amendment’s protection,
giving it the same status as fighting words, true threats, and the like. 201 The
first argument concerns history and tradition, while the second focuses on
free-speech values.
The first argument picks up where the Court in Stevens and
Entertainment Merchants left off. Recall that the Court in those cases
insisted, contrary to Blackstone, that a legislature cannot restrict a
content-defined category of expression based simply on its determination
that, on balance, the expression disserves the common good.202 But the
Court also acknowledged that the First Amendment might permit such
content-based restrictions if they are “part of a long (if heretofore
unrecognized) tradition of proscription.”203 The speech restrictions in
Stevens and Entertainment Merchants could make no such historical
199
Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct,
“Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1336 (2005).
200
Because the arguments I make below focus on the fact that Classmate has been denied equal
access to campus resources, they do echo the kinds of arguments one would make when defending laws
that prevent one student from physically blocking another student’s access to campus. Cf. Erica
Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 722 (2016) (“[W]hen defining new
unprotected categories of speech, determining whether speech fits into a particular category, or applying
the constitutional scrutiny that corresponds to particular categories, a court should give weight to the
harms caused by speech only when these harms can be analogized to conduct harms.”). But I make those
arguments to defend the conclusion that Student Speaker’s speech does not merit the First Amendment’s
protection, not to establish that the speech really is not speech in the first place.
201
See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text (discussing categories of wholly proscribable
speech); see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (“[A] limited categorical approach has remained an important
part of our First Amendment jurisprudence.”).
202
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (“Our decisions [in the modern era]
cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the
scope of the First Amendment.”); Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011) (“Last Term,
in Stevens, we held that new categories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a legislature
that concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated.”); see also supra notes 150–161 and
accompanying text (discussing Stevens and Entertainment Merchants).
203
Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. at 792; see also id. at 795 (“California’s argument would fare better
if there were a longstanding tradition in this country of specially restricting children’s access to depictions
of violence, but there is none.”); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469 (rejecting the federal government’s contention
“that categories of speech may be exempted from the First Amendment’s protection without any longsettled tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation”).
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claim. The statutes challenged in those cases banned, respectively, the
creation, sale, and distribution of materials containing depictions of
certain kinds of animal cruelty204 and the rental or sale of violent video
games to children.205 In both instances, the Court found the speech
restrictions to be unprecedented.206
When it comes to student-on-student harassment, however, the
historical analysis yields a different conclusion. As we have seen, college
and university students enjoyed few free-speech prerogatives during much
of the nation’s history. 207 The pendulum swung powerfully in students’
direction beginning in the 1960s, bringing many constitutional features of
that earlier era to a decisive end. 208 But that pendulum did not swing so far
as to acknowledge a student’s constitutional right to thwart schools’ efforts
to provide educational opportunities for other students. To the contrary,
through a series of enactments that began with Title VI in 1964, the
nation’s lawmakers have imposed significant financial consequences on
schools that deprive some students of equal access to school programs and
activities, including when they fail to take reasonable remedial action when
they know that one student is badly harassing another.209 With more than
half a century of action under those legal principles already under the
nation’s belt, the argument only grows stronger with each passing year that
we have “a longstanding tradition in this country”210 of embracing
Congress’s calculation that the public interest is disserved when schools
knowingly tolerate student-on-student harassment that denies equal access
to harassment victims.
When Congress was first expressing that calculation through landmark
legislation in the 1960s and early 1970s, the Court was revealing that it
saw matters the same way. In the 1972 decision Healy v. James, 211 the
Court held that the First Amendment did not permit a state college to block
students’ efforts to associate with one another in the form of a local chapter

204

Stevens, 559 U.S. at 464–65.
Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. at 789.
206
See id. at 794 (stating that California’s creation of “a wholly new category of content-based
regulation that is permissible only for speech directed at children” was “unprecedented and mistaken”);
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469 (“[W]e are unaware of any . . . tradition excluding depictions of animal cruelty
from ‘the freedom of speech’ codified in the First Amendment, and the Government points us to none.”).
207
See supra notes 142–148 and accompanying text (discussing this history).
208
See supra note 148 (noting this important development).
209
See supra Part I.B (discussing schools’ federal statutory obligations).
210
Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. at 795.
211
408 U.S. 169 (1972).
205
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212

of Students for a Democratic Society. School officials said they feared
the organization would disrupt campus activities, but the Court found those
fears to be unsubstantiated. 213 The eight-member majority also hastened to
explain, however, that “[a]ssociational activities need not be tolerated
where they . . . substantially interfere with the opportunity of other
students to obtain an education.”214 Substantial interference with a
student’s educational opportunities is precisely what one finds when one
student harasses another so badly that the victim loses equal access to
school programs, activities, or facilities. When one student’s speech or
expressive activities block other students from taking equal advantage of
school offerings, it is the former that must yield.
The Justices had made the same point three years earlier in Tinker,215
finding that three junior high and high school students had a First
Amendment right to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands
to school. 216 The Court emphasized that the armband protest had not
“colli[ded] with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let
alone”217 and that the protestors had not “sought to intrude in . . . the lives
of others.”218 It would have been a very different case if the protestors had
significantly impeded other students’ ability to take advantage of the
educational opportunities that the schools were offering them.
When inviting tradition-based arguments of the sort I am making here,
the Court in Stevens and Entertainment Merchants left important questions
unanswered. The Court said, for example, that a content-based speech
restriction might be constitutionally permissible if it is “part of a long . . .
tradition of proscription.”219 But how long is “long”? At what level of
212

See id. at 194.
See id. at 189-90.
214
Id. at 189; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (reiterating the Court’s
commitment to this principle).
215
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
216
See id. at 514 (holding that public K–12 school officials may restrict students’ speech when they
“reasonably . . . forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities”); see
also id. at 505 (finding that “the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was entirely
divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it”); Healy, 408 U.S. at
189 (citing Tinker). In the brief discussion of Tinker above, I do not argue that Tinker’s famous
substantial-disruption standard applies to public colleges and universities in the same ways it applies to
public K–12 schools. Others have sensibly expressed reservations about making that argument. See, e.g.,
McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Public universities have significantly
less leeway in regulating student speech than public elementary or high schools.”); Meggen Lindsay,
Note, Tinker Goes to College: Why High School Free-Speech Standards Should Not Apply to PostSecondary Students—Tatro v. University of Minnesota, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1470, 1481 (2012)
(“Students enrolled at public universities should have a greater degree of free-speech protections than
high school and junior high students.”).
217
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508; see also id. (observing that the protest had not “intrude[d] upon . . . the
rights of other students”); see also id. at 513 (“[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for
any reason . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”).
218
Id. at 514.
219
Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011) (emphasis added).
213
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abstraction should the tradition be defined? 220 Is the relevant tradition of
intolerance limited here to harassment based on the congressionally
specified traits, or can we describe it more broadly?
It seems reasonable to conclude that half a century is ample time to
justify the conclusion that the American people and their governmental
leaders have thoughtfully embraced the antiharassment regime that Title
VI and similar legislation introduced. Moreover, when it comes to defining
the contents of that decades-long tradition, the Court itself appeared to
signal in Healy and Tinker that access-denying expression need not be
tolerated, no matter what communicative specifics it happens to entail.221
For First Amendment purposes, what matters is the interference with other
students’ lives and educational opportunities, rather than the traits invoked
when that interference occurs.
Some readers might wonder, however, whether Congress’s
antiharassment regime has indeed been in place long enough to count.
Even those who conclude that half a century is long enough might
retrospectively wonder about the First Amendment status of
student-on-student verbal harassment that occurred during the legislative
regime’s initial years on the books. It is useful, therefore, to get one’s
bearings within the First Amendment landscape by thinking about core
values relating to the freedom of expression. It is here that we find the
second reason to conclude, as a categorical matter, that the First
Amendment provides no refuge for a student at a public college or
university who verbally harasses a classmate so severely, pervasively, and
objectively offensively that the classmate is denied equal access to school
resources and opportunities.
This second argument springs paradoxically from the fact that
maintaining a community of open and uninhibited discourse is especially
important in the lives of colleges and universities. As the authors of the
widely praised Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at the
University of Chicago put it, institutions of higher education today “should
be expected to provide the conditions within which hard thought, and
therefore strong disagreement, independent judgment, and the questioning
220

Some have argued, for example, that traditions should be narrowly defined when searching for
evidence of unenumerated rights that restrict governments’ regulatory reach into our lives. See, e.g.,
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (“We refer to the most specific level
at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”).
Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997) (“[W]e have a tradition of carefully formulating
the interest at stake in substantive-due-process cases.”).
221
See supra notes 211–218 and accompanying text (discussing Healy and Tinker).
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of stubborn assumptions, can flourish in an environment of the greatest
freedom.”222 The Court has similarly recognized that “[t]he college
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
ideas’”;223 “[t]he Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out
of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection’”;224 “[t]eachers and students must always remain free to inquire,
to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die”;225 and “given
the . . . expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the
university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition.”226
Usually, of course, these principles provide powerful reasons to permit
college and university students to say whatever they think appropriate.227
But these same principles also drive us to the conclusion that students do
222
GEOFFREY R. STONE, MARIANNE BERTRAND, ANGELA OLINTO, MARK SIEGLER, DAVID A.
STRAUSS, KENNETH W. WARREN & AMANDA WOODWARD, UNIV. OF CHI., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (2015) [hereinafter CHICAGO STATEMENT], https://provost.uchicago.edu/
sites/default/files/documents/reports/FOECommitteeReport.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting University of Chicago President Hanna Holborn Gray). The authors of the Chicago Statement
elaborate on the importance of uninhibited inquiry in higher-education communities:

Because the University is committed to free and open inquiry in all matters, it
guarantees all members of the University community the broadest possible latitude to
speak, write, listen, challenge, and learn. Except insofar as limitations on that freedom
are necessary to the functioning of the University, the University of Chicago fully
respects and supports the freedom of all members of the University community “to
discuss any problem that presents itself.”
Of course, the ideas of different members of the University community will often and
quite naturally conflict. But it is not the proper role of the University to attempt to
shield individuals from ideas and opinions they find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even
deeply offensive. Although the University greatly values civility, and although all
members of the University community share in the responsibility for maintaining a
climate of mutual respect, concerns about civility and mutual respect can never be
used as a justification for closing off discussion of ideas, however offensive or
disagreeable those ideas may be to some members of our community.
Id. Dozens of institutions have adopted the Chicago Statement. See Chicago Statement: University and
Faculty Body Support, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC. (June 15, 2021), https://www.thefire.org/
chicago-statement-university-and-faculty-body-support/.
223
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967)).
224
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
225
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion).
226
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
227
See, e.g., Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 667–68, 670–71 (1973) (per curiam) (holding
that a public university could not expel a journalism student for distributing a newspaper containing
language and imagery that some found deeply offensive); see also supra notes 163–167 and
accompanying text (discussing Papish); CHICAGO STATEMENT, supra note 222 (“[I]t is not the proper
role of the University to attempt to shield individuals from ideas and opinions they find unwelcome,
disagreeable, or even deeply offensive.”).
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not have a First Amendment right to verbally harass classmates in ways so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that they deprive those
classmates of equal access to school programs, activities, or facilities in
which they could add their own voices to the mix. When student speech
pushes other students’ voices off campus, it undercuts some of the basic
precepts that justify giving student speech strong constitutional protection
in the first place. One student’s freedom to join a campus community’s
“multitude of tongues” cannot be the freedom to make the multitude less
numerous; one student’s freedom to contribute to a campus community’s
“marketplace of ideas” cannot be the freedom to deprive other students of
opportunities to make marketplace contributions of their own. To say
otherwise would be to assume that the speaker’s harassing utterances are
more valuable than the speech those harassing utterances drive away. That
assumption is one that our most basic First Amendment commitments do
not permit us to indulge.
This values-based argument is not limited to harassment involving the
traits for which Congress has provided special protection—race, color,
national origin, sex, and disability228—but it does carry particularly strong
force when those are indeed the traits at issue. The Court has
acknowledged that enrolling “students who will contribute the most to the
‘robust exchange of ideas’ . . . ‘is of paramount importance in the
fulfillment of [a university’s] mission,’”229 and it has acknowledged that
schools may thus aim to attract “students with diverse interests and
backgrounds to enhance classroom discussion and the educational
experience both inside and outside the classroom.”230 Harassment based on
race or other traits long associated with invidious discrimination risks
driving away voices that can make unique and valuable contributions to
that important project.
Both for historical reasons and for reasons relating to free-expression
values on college and university campuses, therefore, Student Speaker’s
harassment of Classmate in Scenario Two should categorically be deemed
to fall beyond the First Amendment’s protection.

228

See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (describing this legislation).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
230
Id. at 319; see also id. (stating that the law school sought to admit students who could bring “a
perspective different from that of members of groups which have not been the victims of such
discrimination”); id. at 328 (“The Law School’s assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational
benefits is substantiated by respondents and their amici.”).
229
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D. Scenarios Three and Four: Multi-Speaker and Overheard-Speech Situations
In Scenario One—where Student Speaker makes one statement of a
type that would help create a hostile learning environment if many
statements of that type followed—I argued that the speech enjoys full First
Amendment protection. In Scenario Two—where Student Speaker
single-handedly creates a hostile learning environment by repeatedly
directing statements of that same type to Classmate—I argued the contrary.
What happens when the hostile learning environment is created by multiple
students, each of whom claims to be standing in the same legal position as
Student Speaker in Scenario One? Or when Classmate merely overhears
the statements that deprive him or her of equal access to school resources
and opportunities? So far as statutory liability is concerned, these cases
remain relatively straightforward: if the school knows about the
harassment and the harassment concerns a trait that Congress has identified
for special protection, the school is statutorily obliged to intervene in a
reasonable fashion. 231 The constitutional questions, however, are trickier
to resolve.
We might respond to Scenarios Three and Four simply by saying that
the First Amendment gives the speakers no protection because, when they
spoke, they assumed the risk that their speech would create or contribute
to a hostile learning environment for Classmate. The speech-chilling
consequences of that approach, however, would be unacceptable for a
nation that prizes the freedom of expression on its college and university
campuses. It is one thing to encourage adults to think about how their
speech might be received by all who hear it. It is quite another to tell adults
that the government will impose punitive consequences upon them if their
speech happens to draw a particularly adverse reaction. It is still another
to place adults under the threat of such consequences when they are
members of a campus community that purports to encourage “lively and
fearless” inquiry and debate. 232 Under an assumption-of-risk regime, the
wisest path for discipline-averse students to take would be to remain silent
if they have any doubts about whether those who hear what they wish to
say could reasonably regard it as harassing.233 The costs in lost speech
would simply be too high. 234
231

See supra Part I.B (discussing schools’ federal statutory obligations).
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Cf. Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
283, 316 (2001) (“Punishing merely negligent speech will chill legitimate speech by forcing speakers to
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Cf. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (“The overbreadth doctrine
prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected speech
is prohibited or chilled in the process.”); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (explaining
that the overbreadth doctrine is based upon the judgment “that the possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of
others may be muted”).
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We might make headway with Scenario Four (regarding overheard
speech) if we say that the First Amendment allows campus officials to
discipline the student speakers for contributing to Classmate’s hostile
learning environment only if Classmate was a member of the student
speakers’ intended audience. The Foundation for Individual Rights in
Education (“FIRE”) takes this position in its Model Code of Student
Conduct, arguing that a college student’s speech should be deemed
“discriminatory harassment” only when, among other things, it is part of a
“pattern of targeted, unwelcome conduct.”235 FIRE says this requirement
“ensures that [s]tudents are not charged with harassment merely because
third parties happen to overhear remarks they find subjectively
offensive.”236 As supporting authority, FIRE cites Eugene Volokh’s
argument that Title VII liability for hostile-environment harassment in the
workplace should be limited to statements that an employee directs to an
unwelcoming coworker, lest “a vast amount of important public discourse”
be chilled;237 the California Supreme Court’s observation that harassment
is usually less severe when it is directed at others rather than at oneself;238
and the U.S. Supreme Court’s finding that, in many instances, those
offended by expression should simply turn their attention elsewhere, rather
than depend upon the government to intervene. 239
As I indicated when rejecting the assumption-of-risk approach, the
kinds of chilling effects that Professor Volokh identifies deserve
serious—sometimes even dispositive—attention.240 Moreover, as the
California Supreme Court’s observation suggests, the distinction between
being the target of objectionable statements and simply overhearing them
can play a role when resolving disputes concerning hostile learning
environments. Courts facing questions of statutory liability, for example,
sometimes put that distinction to work when evaluating the severity of the
harassment that an individual has suffered.241 But when verbal harassment
235
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rises to the level of being so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that
the harassment’s targets no longer enjoy equal access to school programs
and activities, we ought to think twice before concluding that the First
Amendment frees speakers to pay no regard to how unintended audiences
within earshot might be harmed by what they hear.
Imagine, for example, that several white students at a public university
think it is great fun to refer to one another using the N-word242 and to speak
to one another using a vocabulary and accent that they stereotypically
attribute to Black people. They do not direct their remarks to students of
color; indeed, they laughingly speak to one another this way no matter who
is around. But a Black student frequently overhears them, and the statements
collectively are sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive to
create a hostile learning environment for him. When trying to restore this
student’s equal access, should school leaders be barred from disciplining the
speakers because the classmate is not the person to whom they direct their
statements, even if the speakers have been told that a classmate of color
overhears them and is deeply affected, yet they persist?
For both Scenarios Three and Four, we need a middle path—one that
neither excessively chills harmless speech nor frees speakers to entirely
disregard the access-denying harm their words might inflict. The solution,
I contend, is to add a mens rea component to the First Amendment analysis.
When one examines the categories of speech that the Court has long said
are wholly proscribable, a culpable mens rea sometimes appears
prominently in the definitions. A person’s speech amounts to incitement,
for example, only if he intends to spur others to engage in imminent lawless
action, 243 just as a person issues a true threat only if she intends to make
others believe that she plans to unlawfully harm them. 244 By requiring such
states of mind, the Court avoids chilling vast swaths of ultimately harmless
speech and yet gives the government room to address serious harms that
speech can cause.
sexually charged comments in a team setting, even if not directed specifically to the plaintiff, are relevant
to determining whether the plaintiff was subjected to sex-based harassment.”); Leibovitz v. N.Y.C.
Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 190 (2d Cir. 2001) (acknowledging “that evidence of harassment directed
at other co-workers can be relevant to an employee’s own claim of hostile work environment
discrimination”).
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We did not need to craft a mens rea inquiry to answer the First
Amendment question posed in Scenario Two because a state-of-mind
requirement was already implicitly baked into our analysis. If Student
Speaker single-handedly harasses Classmate in ways that are so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that Classmate loses equal access to
campus life, we can safely assume that, at a minimum, Student Speaker
should have known that his or her speech crossed an important line. An
explicit mens rea requirement would prove useful, however, in situations
like those in Scenarios Three and Four. In those instances, the student
speakers either do not single-handedly create the hostile learning
environment or do not direct their statements to Classmate, so the grounds
for finding constitutionally significant culpability are less clear.
For speech that creates hostile learning environments, what should the
mens rea standard be? A negligence-based “should have known” threshold
would not demand enough of the government in multi-speaker and
overheard-speech situations like those in Scenarios Three and Four. That
standard would give school leaders tremendous latitude to make judgments
about what speakers ought to have known about the composition and
sensibilities of their intended and unintended audiences. That
decision-making latitude would, in turn, chill the speech of students who
reasonably conclude that it is safer to say nothing than to say something that
might offensively challenge others’ deeply held commitments.245 Requiring
intent to deprive classmates of equal access to school resources and
opportunities, on the other hand, would demand too much.246 The white
students’ speech in my hypothetical is patently troubling, for example, and
there is no good reason why the student of color should have to lose equal
access to school resources simply because the speakers’ intent is merely to
amuse themselves.
We would best be served by a standard modeled after the actual-malice
standard that, under Sullivan, limits speakers’ defamation liability for
statements made about public officials and public figures.247 The
actual-malice standard insulates speakers from tort liability unless they make
their defamatory statements knowing that the statements are false or
245

Cf. Rothman, supra note 233, at 316–17 (rejecting a negligence standard for threats because
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recklessly disregarding the possibility that they are false. A speaker
recklessly disregards the possibility that a statement is false when he or she
knows that it probably is false but makes it anyway.249 In our setting here, of
course, we are not necessarily worried about statements’ falsity or about the
freedom to discuss prominent individuals. But we are searching for a
standard that is faithful to colleges’ and universities’ commitment to
discourse that is “lively and fearless.”250 The Sullivan Court crafted the
actual-malice standard because it faced a similar need—namely, the need to
ensure that discourse about matters of public significance is “uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.”251
Adapting the actual-malice standard for our purposes here, we would
say that the First Amendment permits a public college or university to
impose discipline for student speech that creates or contributes to a
classmate’s hostile learning environment only if (1) the speaker
single-handedly creates that environment through speech directed to the
harassed classmate, as in Scenario Two, or (2) one or more speakers make
the harassing statements knowing that they will probably help create a
hostile learning environment for a classmate, and such an environment is
indeed created as a result. This is a decidedly pro-speech standard that
would allow a lot of offensive speech to initially go unchecked. But note
that the speech initially goes unchecked. The standard assigns a legal
function to schools’ educational efforts to advise students about the nature
and impact of harassment within their campus communities. By talking
with speakers who have made harassing statements of the sort that could
lead to other students’ loss of equal access if repeated with sufficient
frequency, campus leaders can put speakers on notice of the harms their
speech might cause if it persists. With that foundation in place, it becomes
easier to satisfy the requirements of the mens rea standard when the severe
and objectively offensive harassment continues and a student suffers a
denial of equal access as a result.
In my example concerning overheard racist speech,252 the student
speakers would be susceptible to discipline if both (1) their speech
collectively amounted to severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive
248
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (stating that the First Amendment “prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not”); see also Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163–64
(1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the Sullivan standard should govern
defamation suits brought by public figures, a point on which a majority of the Justices agreed).
249
See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (explaining that a person makes a
statement with “reckless disregard” for its truth only if he or she “in fact entertain[s] serious doubts as to
the [statement’s] truth” and that a speaker is liable only if he or she knew the statement was probably
false).
250
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harassment, and (2) the speakers knew they probably were creating that
hostile learning environment, even if it was not their intent. If these
speakers are not initially aware of the impact their speech is probably
having, they can be advised about that impact, thereby setting the stage for
more aggressive institutional intervention if the harassment continues. We
would say the same thing about the two student speakers in Scenario Three
who separately make harassing statements that, when combined, create a
hostile learning environment for a classmate. 253 Those student speakers
might or might not be subject to discipline, depending on what they knew
at the time they made their statements. The more that a speaker learns about
the likely impact of his or her contemplated speech, the greater his or her
exposure to constitutionally permissible discipline.
IV. CONCLUSION
Explicitly rejecting the Blackstonian principles that influenced many
Americans’ thinking about expressive freedoms during the nation’s first
century, 254 the modern Court has constructed a First Amendment regime
that provides us with strong protection to say what we wish without fear
of adverse legal consequences. 255 Unlike their early-American
predecessors, students today carry that protection with them, in full, when
they pursue postsecondary studies at public colleges and universities. 256
Students’ resulting expressive freedoms are appropriately vast, but
they are not unlimited. Both as a matter of tradition and as a matter of
core free-speech values, students do not have a First Amendment right to
harass other students in ways so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that harassment victims are denied equal access to school
programs, activities, or facilities.257 That principle is most easily applied
when a student single-handedly inflicts access-denying harassment upon a
targeted classmate. 258 But we can also deploy it—albeit in a more limited
fashion—when multiple student speakers combine to create the harassment
or when harassing speech is merely overheard. In those instances, the
student speakers should be deemed constitutionally susceptible to
discipline only if they make their harassing utterances knowing that they
253
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are probably thereby contributing to a classmate’s hostile learning
environment, and such an environment is indeed created as a result. 259 If
student speakers are not aware of such problems when they first make their
harassing statements, others can lay the informational groundwork that
will render a more punitive response constitutionally permissible if the
harassment sufficiently persists. The resulting legal regime will ensure that
no student has a First Amendment right to drive other students away from
campus life, while also ensuring, to the greatest extent practicable, that
campus dialogue is—to borrow the Court’s famous phrase—“uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.”260
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